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Summary  findings
A major result of the Uruguay Round was the creation of  *  The sector-specificity  of liberalization  commitments.
a General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The  Negotiations were driven by the concerns of major
GATS greatly extends coverage of the multilateral  players of each industry, leading to an emphasis on
trading system, establishing rules and disciplines on  "absolute" sectoral reciprocity, limiting the scope for
policies affecting access to service markets.  incremental liberalization, tradeoffs across issues, and an
In this paper Hoekman asks: What does the GATS do  economywide perspective.
to bind policies? And has it established a mechanism  *  The limited  number  of  generic  rules.  Rather than
likely to induce significant liberalization through future  lock in liberal situations that exist, the GATS allows for
rounds of negotiations?  the future imposition of restrictions (creating
The GATS consists of two elements:  "negotiating chips"). To foster nondiscriminatory
* A set of general  concepts, principles, and rules that  liberalization, sectoral agreements should be firmly
apply across the board to measures affecting trade in  imbedded in a framework of general  rules and
services, and  disciplines. Many of the framework's general principles
* Specific  commitments on national treatment and  apply only if specific commitments have been made.
market access. These apply only to service activities listed  Therefore they are not general.
in a member's schedule - reflecting the agreement's  Proposals for improving the GATS should probably
"positive-list" approach to determining coverage - and  build on the existing structure as much as possible.
only to the extent that sector-specific or cross-sectoral  Possibilities include the following:
qualifications or conditions are not maintained.  *  Ultimately, apply the same rules to goods and
The impact of the GATS depends largely on the  services. Eliminate the artificial distinction between the
specific commitments made by members, and sectoral  two.
coverage is far from universal. High-income countries  * Adopt a negative-list approach to scheduling
scheduled about half of their service sectors; developing  commitments for the sake of transparency.
countries as a group  (including Eastern European  * Eliminate overlap between national treatment and
countries in transition) scheduled only 11 percent. And  market access.
the sectors scheduled often continue to be subject to  *  Develop generic, "horizontal" disciplines for the
measures that violate national treatment or limit market  different modes of supply through which service markets
access. High-income countries scheduled only 28 percent  may be contested.
of the universe of services without exceptions to national  *  Explore the possibility of converting quota-like
treatment or market access obligations. For developing  market access restrictions to price-based equivalent
countries, that figure is only 6.5 percent. Much remains  measures, thus ensuring that the most-favored-nation
to be done.  and national treatment principles are satisfied.
The GATS's weaknesses include:  *  Make framework disciplines general by eliminating
* A lack of transparency.  No information is generated  all instances in which rules are conditional on the
on sectors, subsectors, and activities in which no  scheduling of specific commitments.
commitments are scheduled - most often the sensitive  * Agree to a formula-based approach for liberalizing
areas where restrictions and discriminatory practices  and expanding the GATS's sectoral coverage in future
abound.  negotiations.
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One of the major results of the Uruguay Round  was the creation of a General Agreement  on
Trade in Services  (GATS). The GATS establishes  rules and disciplines  on policies affecting  access to
service  markets, greatly extending  the coverage  of the multilateral trading system. In some respects  it
is a landmark  achievement. In other respects  it can be considered  to be a failure.  It is a landmark in
terms of creating  a multilateral  disciplines in virgin territory; a failure in terms of generating
liberalization. Commnitments  made in the Uruguay round on services are best described  as bound
standstill agreements  for policies pertaining  to specific  sectors.  Abstracting  from ongoing talks on
financial  services, liberalization  awaits future rounds  of negotiations. This suggests  there are two key
issues that must be addressed in evaluating  the GATS. First, what does it do to hind  current policies?
Second,  has it established  a mechanism  that is likely to induce significant  liberalization  in the future?
The primary objective  of this paper is to provide answers  to these questions.
The GATS consists of two main elements: (i) a set of general concepts,  principles  and rules
that apply  across the board to measures affecting  trade in services; and (ii) specific  commitments  on
national  treatment  and market access. The latter apply only to service activities  that are listed in a
Member's schedule--reflecting  the so-called  positive  list approach that was taken to determine  the
coverage  of the Agreement--and  then only to the extent  that sector-specific  or cross-sectoral
qualifications  or conditions  are not maintained. To a very large extent the impact  of the GATS
depends  on the specific  commitments  that are made by Members.  An analysis  of the commitments
made by Members reveals  that the sectoral coverage  of specific  commitments  is far from universal.
High-income  countries scheduled  about 50 percent of their service sectors; developing  countries  as a
group (including  the Eastern European  economies  in transition) only 11 percent.  In many cases such
scheduled  sectors continue  to be subject  to measures  that violate national  treatment  or limit market
access. Only 28 percent of the universe  of services  was scheduled  by high-income  countries  without
listing any exceptions  to national  treatment or market access  obligations. For developing  countries  as
a group the figure is 6.5 percent.  Much remains  to be done.
The GATS has a number of weaknesses,  including  a lack of transparency,  the sector-
specificity  of liberalization  commitments,  and the limited number  of generic rules. The GATS does
not do anything  near enough to ensure transparency. No information  is generated  on sectors, sub-
sectors and activities in which no commitments  are scheduled--most  often the sensitive  ones where
restrictions  and discriminatory  practices abound. This is a serious shortcoming  given the nature of
impediments  to trade in services  (i.e. regulatory  barriers at both the national  and sub-national  levels).
Negotiations  in the services  area were (and will be) sectoral, driven very much by the concerns  and
interests of the major players in each industry. This has led to an emphasis  on achieving  'absolute'
sectoral reciprocity, limiting the scope for incremental  liberalization,  cross-issue  tradeoffs,  and an
economy-wide  perspective. Specific  commitments  for sectors distinguish  four modes of supply--cross
border, through establishment  (commercial  presence),  involving  consumer  movement,  or via the
temporary presence  of foreign  providers.  Allowing  for modes of supply distinctions  may distort
resource  allocation  by creating  the opportunity  for biasing incentives  towards a particular mode of
supply.  Thus, commitments  of developing  countries  under the commercial  presence  mode of supply
tend to be the least restrictive. Firms therefore may be given an incentive  to engage  in 'tariff-
hopping' type investment. Another potentially  perverse incentive  created by the combination  of
specific  commitments  and the positive list approach  to coverage is that Members may be induced  to
adopt  policies that are in principle  prohibited, and then seek to negotiate  these away over time.
Rather than locking-in  a liberal situation  if it exists, the GATS allows for the future imposition  of
restrictions  (creation  of 'negotiating chips').  To foster nondiscriminatory  liberalization,  sectoralagreements  should  be firmly embedded  in a framework  of general  rules and disciplines. Currently,
many of the framework's  general principles apply only if specific commitments  have been made.
They are therefore  not general.
The implications  for developing  countries of the GATS are limited. The GATS imposes few
limitations  on national  policy, only requiring that no discrimination  across alternative  sources  of
supply occurs.  Many developing  countries have been able to accede  to the GATS with only minimal
specific commitments. The non-generality  of national  treatment, and the sector-specificity  of market
access commitments  reduces  the value of the GATS to governments  seeking  to liberalize. Lobbies
that oppose liberalization  cannot  be told that GATS membership  implies  national  treatment for all
sectors. Instead, it must explicitly list each and every sector to ensure that national  treatment  and
market access  obligations  will apply. This clearly  makes  matters much more difficult  for
governments  that 'need' an external  justification  for resisting  protectionist  pressures.
There are many challenges  that need to be addressed  by negotiators if the GATS is to become
an effective  and therefore credible  instrument  of multilateral  liberalization. The sectoral coverage  of
the GATS must be greatly expanded  through binding  of all measures  violating  national
treatment/market  access. The set of generally  applicable  rules and disciplines  must grow
significantly,  and the weight  of the specific commitments  reduced. The approach  taken towards
scheduling  commitments  in the Uruguay round needs to be critically  assessed  to determine  whether it
will be conducive  to achieving  significant  liberalization  of service markets in the future.
Realism  suggests  that proposals  for improving  GATS build upon the existing  structure as
much as possible. Much can be done if the willingness  to do so is there. Possibilities  include the
following: (1) adopt  a negative  list approach  to scheduling  for transparency  purposes--i.e., agree that
all sectors are covered  in principle, but allow for Members  to list exceptions--with  a transition period
that gives Members  sufficient  time to do this; (2) eliminate  all overlap between  national  treatment and
market access,  ensuring that the latter applies only to non-discriminatory  measures;  (3) seek to agree
to horizontal  disciplines  on modes of supply, and eliminate  mode-of-supply-specific  limitations  in the
schedules;  (4) expand  the reach of the market access  article by including  the term "or measures with
equivalent  effect";  (5) convert  quota-like  market access  restrictions to price-based  equivalent  measures
by auctioning  them off, thus ensuring that the most-favored-nation  and national  treatment principles
are satisfied;  (6) make all framework  disciplines  generally  applicable  by eliminating  all instances
where rules are currently conditional  upon the scheduling  of specific commitments;  and (7) agree to a
formula-based  approach  for future liberalization  and expansion  of the sectoral coverage  of the GATS.
GATT experience  suggests  that progress in trade negotiations  is facilitated  if negotiators  use a
quantifiable  focal point. A 'formula' approach  could help negotiations  to make progress. A target
could be established  for the share of each Member's service sector that should  be scheduled  with 'no
restrictions' and for the share of the GNS list that should be bound (scheduled).
More generally  it must be recognized  that the problems involved  in 'fixing' the GATS extend
beyond services. Future multilateral  efforts must center on eliminating  the artificial  goods-services
distinction,  and develop  generic disciplines  on foreign  direct investment  (establishment)  and labor
movement. It will be important  that attention is devoted to both goods and services  in this
connection,  and that the same rules apply to goods and services.I.  Introduction
One of the major results of the Uruguay Round was the creation of a General Agreement on
Trade in Services  (GATS). The GATS establishes  rules and disciplines on policies affecting  access to
service markets, greatly extending  the coverage  of the multilateral  trading system. In some respects it
is a landmark  achievement. In other respects it can be considered  to be a failure.  It is a landmark in
terms of creating a  multilateral disciplines in virgin territory; a  failure in terms of  generating
liberalization.  Commitments made in the Uruguay round on services are best described as bound
standstill agreements  for policies pertaining to specific sectors.  Abstracting from ongoing talks on
financial  services,  liberalization  awaits future rounds of negotiations. This suggests  there are two key
issues  that must be addressed in evaluating  the GATS. First, what does it do to bind current policies?
Second,  has it established  a mechanism  that is likely  to induce  significant  liberalization  in the future? The
primary objective  of this paper is to provide answers  to these questions.
The paper starts in Section II with a brief overview of global trade flows in services and a
discussion  of the implications  of the lack of information  on trade barriers for multilateral  negotiations.
Section  III provides a summary of the main elements  of the GATS.  Section IV analyzes  the sectoral
coverage  of the commitments  made by the 96 Members  that had presented  their services  schedules  to the
GATT  Secretariat  as of mid-1994.' Section  V discusses  possible implications  of the scheduling  approach
that was chosen, and asks whether future negotiations  in the GATS context  are likely to lead towards a
fully nondiscriminatory  trade regime (as opposed to managed  trade).  Section  VI turns to options for
addressing  the architectural  weaknesses  of the GATS. Section VII concludes.
II.  Trade Flows, Market  Access Barriers, and Data Issues
Driven  by  innovations in  information technology, increasing specialization and  product
differentiation,  as well as government  policies such as deregulation  and liberalization,  trade in services
grew faster than trade in merchandise  throughout  the last decade. As shown in Table 1, in 1992  global
services  trade (non-factor  services  in the balance  of payments  minus government  transactions  plus labor
income) stood at some US $930 billion.  This was equal to 22.7 percent of global trade (goods plus
services), as  compared to  18.8 percent  in  1980.  Such trade occurs  across borders  (i.e,  via
telecommunications  media), via physical movement  of consumers to the location  of service providers
(e.g.,  tourism), or via temporary entry of service providers into the territory of a consumer (e.g.,
consulting). The average  annual  growth rate of services  trade over the last decade was  8.3 percent. Both
industrialized  and developing  countries  have seen the relative importance  of trade in services increase,
although services account for a larger share of the total trade of OECD countries.  In 1992, OECD
countries  accounted  for 82 percent  of global  exports of commercial  services,  up from 79 percent in 1982.
'The term  Member  is used  to  denote  that  signatories  of the  GATS  are  members  of an international  organization,
the WTO,  and not simply  contracting  parties  to a treaty,  and  because  signatories  are not always  countries.
1Table 1: Global Trade  Flows, 1980 and 1992 (US $ billion and percentage)
1980  1992  Average annual change
Total  trade in services  358  931  8.3
OECD  (shares  in parentheses)  283 (79%)  765 (82%)  8.6
Rest of world  75 (21%)  166 (18%)  6.8
Services  as share  of goods  and services  17.0  22.0  2.2
OECD  18.8  22.7  1.6
Rest of world  12.7  19.2  3.5
Source: World  Bank. Data  pertain  only  to countries  reporting  to the IMF.
Many services are not tradable, in the sense that cross-border, 'long-distance' exchange or
temporary physical movement  of provider/consumer  does not suffice for an exchange to be feasible
(Bhagwati, 1984). Producers  of such services can contest foreign markets only through establishing  a
long-term physical presence in these markets, i.e.,  engage in foreign direct investment  (FDI).  Not
surprisingly, FDI in services  accounts for a large share of the total stock of inward FDI in most host
countries. As of the early 1990s,  some 50 percent of the global  stock of FDI was in services  activities.
The share of annual flows to many countries has been over 60 percent in recent years. 2 The relative
importance  of trade in services  (as registered  in the balance  of payments  of a country)  as opposed  to sales
of services  by affiliates  is not known. Conventional  wisdom  holds that FDI is likely to be the dominant
'mode of  supply' for  many services, but  that this dominance is being eroded by  technological
developments. U.S. data, the only country that currently collects detailed data on both its trade in
services and sales of services  by affiliates  of U.S. parent companies,  suggest that trade and sales are of
roughly the same  importance. 3 Not too much  can be inferred  from this, however,  as both trade and sales
via FDI will in part reflect the barriers to the various modes of supply that are imposed by partner
countries. Quantitative  measures  of these barriers currently  do not exist (see below).
Available  data on trade in services  are very weak compared  to those on merchandise  (see Box
1). Only a limited  number of industrialized  countries  collect  and report statistics  on trade in services  at
a relatively disaggregated  level (e.g., ten categories  or more).  Most non-OECD  countries  only report
data on trade in "commercial  services" broken down into "transport" (largely freight and passenger
transport by sea and air), "travel" (expenditures  by nonresidents  - mostly tourists - while staying  in a
2 See UNCTAD  and World  Bank  (1994)  for data  on FDI in services.
3 In 1987  foreign  sales  by U.S.  majority  owned  affiliates  were  15  percent  smaller  than  service  exports;  in 1992
they  had grown  to be 20 percent  larger  (World  Bank,  1995).
2foreign country), 4 and "other services."  The last category includes items such as brokerage,  insurance,
conmmunications,  leasing and rental of equipment, technical and professional services, income generated
by the temporary movement of labor, as well as property income (royalties).
Box 1: Services Data Needs and Weaknesses
The main source  of data on trade in services are the balance  of payments  (BOP). They have many weaknesses:
Consistency  and  Coverage - A user of BOP statistics  cannot  be certain that  what is reported, for example,
for exports of port services  by country  A consists  of the same  items as reported  exports  of port services  by country
B.  Moreover, at virtually any level of aggregation, some nations  may not report information  on a certain item.
Examples include maritime shipment  exports and air transport services, as well as many types of business and
professional  services. This results  in  biased figures  when  data are added  across  countries  to arrive  at regional  totals,
and discrepancies  when comparing  world imports and exports for a category.
Trade by Origin  and Destination  - This information  is not available  on a comparable  and detailed basis.
Some  countries  report information  on the direction of trade by geographic  region or by major trading partner, but
most countries do not do this.
Disaggregation  - The amount of detail or disaggregation  for data on trade in services is very limited.
Trade data on a volume  basis - BOP data on services trade is only available  on a value basis.  The lack
of volume and quality  adjusted  data makes it very difficult to determine  what proportion of growth in a category
in a given year is due to inflation as opposed  to improvements  in quality.
Comrarability  across time - When comparing developments  in trade in services over time at both the
country  and the global  level, another  problem  is that  methodologies  and  definitions  employed  by countries  may vary
between  different  years. Often, countries  may have improved  the sectoral  coverage  of their data collection  efforts
at some  point in time, making it difficult to determine  to what extent an increase in recorded  trade in services for
a specific time period is 'real,'  as opposed  to being due to improvements  in data collection.
Concordances  -It is quite  difficult--if  not impossible-to  relate service  trade statistics  to  domestic  production
and employment  data.  To some extent this is because different countries include different items in various
components of the current account.  More important is that trade data are simply too aggregated, so that
concordances  have little meaning. Even  if disaggregated  trade data existed that were consistent  across  countries,
trade statistics  include items  that do not appear in the national accounts. An example is expenditure  by travellers.
Data on sales by foreign  affiliates - BOP conventions  imply  that if factors  of production  move to another
country  for a period  longer than one year, a change in residency  status is considered  to have occurred. The output
generated  by such factors  that is sold in the host market  will no longer be registered as trade in the BOP. Data on
the magnitude  of sales by affiliates and natural persons that have established  in a foreign  host country  are rarely
collected. The U.S. is a notable exception.
For more detailed  discussions  of the shortcomings  of services  data, see Hoekman  and Stem (1991).
4 Note that part of tourist expenditures  will be on goods (e.g., souvenirs  or artifacts).
3Table 2 provides an overview of the relative importance of these three main categories of trade
for major country groups.  Industrialized countries dominate global exports in all three  categories.  In
relative  terms developing countries have the  greatest export share for  'travel'  (i.e.,  tourism)  with  17
percent of total exports.
Table 2: Shares in Global Service Exports and Relative Specialization, 1980 and 1992
Country group  Travel  Transport  All Other
1980  1992  1980  1992  1980  1992
Share in global trade:
OECD members  71.6  77.9  78.4  81.8  80.2  84.6
Developing  countries  21.8  17.3  16.5  12.5  15.3  11.7
Relative  specialization:  ___
OECD  members  1.01  0.96  1.10  1.02  1.13  1.06
Developing  countries  0.93  1.12  0.65  0.82  0.65  0.74
Small LDCs (I million  people or less)  2.19  3.45  1.19  1.85  0.39  1.11
Although in aggregate value terms global trade in services is dominated by the OECD, this does
not  imply  that  developing  countries  have  little  interest  in  services  trade.  To  the  contrary,  many
developing countries are relatively specialized in exporting services.  Table 2 also provides  some data
on revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indices for selected country groups.'  Small countries (defined
as those with less than one million people) are the most specialized in exports of services. Moreover,
their relative specialization increased significantly during the last decade.  These countries have higher
than  average export intensities for all three  services categories, but are clearly  most highly specialized
in travel, that is, tourism.  The relative importance of travel receipts was about twice the world average
in 1980, rising to over three times in 1992.
Cross-country  data on  the magnitude  of barriers  to trade  in services  do  not exist.  Because
services are generally intangible and often nonstorable, barriers to trade do not take the form of import
tariffs.  Instead,  trade  barriers  take  the  form  of  prohibitions,  quantitative  restrictions  (QRs),  and
government regulation.  QRs may limit the quantity and/or value of imports of specific products for a
I These are defined as the ratio of exports of a product category  to a country's total exports of goods and
services, divided by the saine ratio for the world: RCA = [X,j/Y)j/fX1'/YJI,  where  Xy,  are exports of product  i by
country  j,  Y 1 are total exports of goods and services by country  j,  and w stands for the "world:" the sum of all
countries). The value of this index may range from zero to a very large number. If the index is greater  than one
this implies that the country  is relatively  specialized  in the product concemed.
4given time period;  or restrict the number and/or market  share of foreign service providers  allowed to
establish.  Such discriminatory QRs are often complemented by measures that apply to both foreign and
domestic  service providers.  These usually  consist  of limitations on  the number  of firms  allowed to
contest a market, or on the nature of their operations.  Frequently, this involves either a monopoly (e.g.
basic teleconimunications  services) or  oligopolistic  market  structures  (e.g.  banking or self-regulating
professional services).  Often such market structures are tolerated because of the asymmnetric  information
problems that are inherent in many service exchanges -- services frequently being experience or credence
goods.  Considerations relating to consumer protection, prudential supervision and regulatory oversight
often induce governments to require establishment by  foreign providers  (e.g.  financial or professional
services), or reserve activities for government-owned or controlled/regulated entities.
The nonexistence tariffs as a  restraint  to trade  greatly complicates the life of those seeking to
analyze or to negotiate incremental reductions  in barriers  to services trade.  In terms of analysis,  what
is required is the estimation of the tariff-equivalent of a given set of measures and regulations pertaining
to a service activity/sector.  Very little work has been done in this connection. 6 Negotiators require a
focal point--some tangible variable enabling parties to set objectives, evaluate the position of others, and
assess negotiating progress.  In past merchandise trade negotiations, the focus of negotiators centered on
the value of bilateral trade flows and the matching vector of applied tariffs.  This focal point is a measure
that takes into account the relative size of different countries (trade volume) and is simple to calculate.
The complexities associated with identifying and quantifying barriers  to trade  in services focused the
attention of negotiators  on  rules.  Thus,  a substantial amount  of time and  resources  was devoted to
determining whether and how GATT-like concepts such as national treatment and MFN could be applied
to service sectors.  Indeed, discussions rapidly became sector-specific.  But rather than  focusing on the
identification, quantification and reduction of barriers,  absolute sectoral reciprocity became the norm.
This  contrasts  with  the  'first-difference'  approach  to  reciprocity  used  in  GATT  tariff  negotiations
(Bhagwati,  1988).'
6 As discussed  in greater  detail in Hoekman  (1994),  research  has focused  primarily  on theoretical issues, not
on empirical  analyses. While perhaps  not surprising,  given the difficulties  involved  in generating data on barriers
to trade, this has meant that negotiators  have had little in the way of guidance  regarding the costs and benefits  of
alternative negotiating  strategies/policy  stances. It is beyond the scope  of this paper to discuss  the myriad issues
that complicate estimation of 'tariff equivalents' or price-cost margins in the services context.  In addition to
'standard' problems  that arise in modeling  the effect of nontariff  measures  (see, e.g., Deardorff  and Stem, 1985),
account  needs to  be taken  of nondiscriminatory  market  access  restrictions;  the importance  of natural  barriers  to trade
(distance,  language,  climate, etc.); the fact  that establishment  is often  required;  complementarities  between  modes
of supply; prevalence  of joint production  (e.g., the need for consumer/provider  to cooperate); and the role of
reputation  and non-price  competition  in many service industries. See, e.g., Hindley  (1988),  Messerlin  and Sauvant
(1990), Sapir (1993), Sapir and Winter (1994) and UNCTAD  and World Bank (1994).
7 Space constraints  prevent a summary  of negotiating  positions  and issues. See e.g., Brock (1982),  Bhagwati
(1987a,b),  Drake  and  Nicolaidis  (1992),  Feketekuty  (1988),  Giersch  (1989),  Grey  (1985),  Helleiner  (1988),  Hindley
(1990), Richardson  (1987), Sampson  and Snape (1985), Sapir (1985), and Snape  (1990).
5III.  A Synopsis of GATS Disciplines
The GATS consists of four main elements: 8 (i) a set of general  concepts, principles and rules
that apply across  the board to measures  affecting  trade in services; (ii) specific  commitments  on national
treatment and market access that apply to those service sectors and sub-sectors that are listed in a
Member's schedule, subject to sector-specific  or cross-sectoral  qualifications  or conditions (if any);
(iii) an understanding  that periodic negotiations  will be undertaken  to progressively  liberalize trade is
services;  and (iv) a set of attachlnents  that include  annexes  that take into  account  sectoral specificities  and
Ministerial  Decisions that relate to the implementation  of the GATS.
The  GATS applies to  measures imposed by  a  Member to  the Agreement that affect the
consumption  of services originating  in other Members (Article 1). The Agreement applies to all four
'modes of supply': (i) cross-border  supply of a service (i.e., not requiring the physical movement  of
supplier  or consumer);  (ii) provision  involving  movement  of the consumer  to the country  of the supplier;
(iii) services sold in the territory of a Member  by (legal) entities that have established a commercial
presence  there but originate in the territory of another Member; and (iv) provision  of services requiring
the temporary  movement  of natural persons. 9 The Agreement  does not apply to services supplied  in the
exercise of governmental  functions.
MFN, national treatment, and market access
The core principle of the GATT is nondiscrimination,  as reflected in its most-favored-nation
(MFN) and national  treatment  rules. These rules apply  generally  in the GATT - i.e., to all trade flows  -
except insofar as explicit allowance is made for their violation (e.g.,  in the context of  regional
integration). MFN and national  treatment are also key elements  of the GATS. However, their reach is
less all-encompassing  in the GATS.  The coverage of MFN for each GATS Member is subject to a
negative  list--it applies to all services except  those listed by each Member. The coverage of national
treatment is determined  by a 'conditional'  positive list approach--i.e.,  it only applies to sectors listed in
a country's schedule,  and then only insofar  as existing  measures  are not exempted. In addition to the two
central GATT-principles,  the GATS introduces  a commitment  not found in the GATT: a market access
obligation. Its reach is determined  by a positive listing of sectors by each GATS Member.
Although  MFN is a general obligation,  the GATS  contains  an Annex  allowing  countries  to invoke
an exemption  to MFN.  MFN exemptions  may only be made upon the entry into force of the agreement.
8 For the complete  text  of the GATS,  see GATT  (1994).
9  This  follows  the  typology  suggested  in the  academic  literature,  especially  Bhagwati  (1984)  and Sampson  and
Snape  (1985).  'Trade  in services'  in the  GATS  context  therefore  covers  both  trade  in the  balance  of  payments  sense
and local  sales  by foreign  affiliates.
6Once a Member, further exemptions can only be sought by requesting the Ministerial Conference of the
WTO for a waiver (which must be approved by three quarters of the Members).  MFN exemptions are
in principle to  last no  longer than ten years and are subject to negotiation in future trade  liberalizing
rounds, the first of which must take place within 5 years of the entry into force of the agreement.  The
need for an annex on MFN  exceptions  largely reflected a concern  on the part of some industries that
MFN  allowed competitors  located in countries with relatively restrictive  policies to benefit from their
sheltered  markets  while  enjoying  a  'free  ride'  in  less  restrictive  export  markets.  This  concern  was
expressed vividly in GATS discussions on financial services and telecommunications, prompting industry
representatives in relatively  'open'  countries to lobby for  MFN exemptions as a way to force sectoral
reciprocity.'"  In the closing days of the Uruguay Round it became clear that a number of participants
were ready to invoke the Annex on MFN  exceptions for financial services, basic telecommunications,
maritime transport, and/or audio-visual services.  Rather than allow a situation to develop where countries
would withdraw already tabled commitments in these areas and/or exempt them from the MFN obligation,
a  compromise solution  was reached under  which negotiations  on  a  number of these  sectors  were to
continue without endangering the establishment of the GATS (and the WTO).
Negotiations on financial services, basic telecommunications and maritime transport were restarted
in the spring of 1994.  Of the three,  only those on financial services are to be concluded rapidly: within
six months of the entry into force of the WTO.  If negotiations are not successful - i.e.,  the market access
offers made by a certain countries are not satisfactory to other, demandeur, countries - Members are free
to  withdraw  conditional  offers  in  this  area  (invoke  an  MFN  exemption).  Negotiations  on  basic
telecommunications  and  maritime  transport  are  to  be  concluded  by  end-April  and  end-June  1996,
respectively.  Until then, both the MFN requirement and the possibility of invoking an exemption shall
not  enter  into  force  for  these  services,  except  to  the  extent  that  a  Member  has  made  a  specific
commitment for a sector.
Over 60 GATS Members submitted MFN exemptions.  Three sectors in particular are affected:
audio-visual services, financial services, and transportation (road, air and maritime).  Exemptions in the
audio-visual area  tend to be justified on the basis  of cultural  objectives, allowing for preferential  co-
production and/or distribution arrangements with a limited number of countries.  Exemptions for financial
services are usually motivated by reciprocity concerns: countries seeking the flexibility to retaliate against
Members that do not offer reciprocal access to financial service markets.  The goal of many Members
in this connection appears to be to maintain some leverage vis-a-vis the United States."  Exemptions in
'° The issue  here was mostly  one of industries  in relatively  open markets  seeking  to  obtain  access  to more  closed
markets. It was not that  the demandeur  industries  feared  'cross-subsidized'  competition.  This  implies  that the carrot
that is on offer--MFN--is  unlikely to induce much pressure in countries being asked to open up to do so.
" Interestingly,  the EU made  an exemption  for distribution  of audiovisual  works  and audiovisual  services  more
generally, allowing it to impose "redressive  duties ... to respond to unfair pricing practices' by third country
distributors, and to "prevent, correct or counterbalance  adverse, unfair, or unreasonable  conditions or actions
7the transport area often are motivated by the UNCTAD Liner Code (a concern for many African
countries in particular), or the existence  of bilateral/regional  agreements. The significance  of the MFN
exemptions  should  not be exaggerated. Audio-visual  and transport  services were always  expected  to be
hard nuts to crack.  A breakdown  of the financial  services  talks should not have much of an impact  on
the GATS  coverage as this is largely a bilateral  affair, involving  the U.S. on one side and Japan on the
other (Financial  Times, August 16, 1994).
It is noteworthy  that many MFN exemptions  concern  existing regional integration  agreements.
As is the case under the GATT, the GATS makes  explicit  allowance  for the violation  of MFN through
the formation  of economic  integration  agreements  involving  Members, subject  to three conditions. First,
they  must  have  "substantial sectoral coverage."  Second, they  must  either  eliminate existing
discriminatory  measures  and/or prohibit  the introduction  of new  ones. Third, the overall  level of barriers
to trade in services against  other GATS members  within the respective  sectors or sub-sectors  must not
rise above  the level  previously  applicable. There is no requirement  that integration  agreements  be 'open'
in principle to the accession  of third countries." 2 As explored  at some length in Hoekman  and Sauve
(1994), these conditions  are weaker  than those applying  in the GATT context. The second  condition in
particular is weak: a mere standstill agreement  may be sufficient. The weakness  of the disciplines on
regional economic integration imply only a limited constraint on 'strategic' violations of the MFN
obligation. Notwithstanding  this, many countries  felt the need  to take MFN exemptions  justified on the
basis of existing  regional integration  agreements.
As mentioned  earlier, market access  and national  treatment  are so-called specific  commitments.
These obligations  apply only to services that are included  in the schedules  of Members, and then only
subject to whatever  qualifications  or conditions  are listed. Six types of market access  restrictions  are in
principle  prohibited. These  consist of limitations  on: (i) the number  of service suppliers  allowed,  (ii) the
value  of transactions  or assets, (iii) the total quantity  of service  output, (iv) the number  of natural  persons
that may be employed,  (v) the type of legal entity through  which a service supplier  is pernitted to supply
a service (e.g., branches  vs. subsidiaries  for banking),  and (vi) participation  of foreign  capital in terms
of a maximum  percentage limit of foreign shareholding  or the absolute value of foreign investment.
National  treatment  is defined  as treatment  no less favorable  than that accorded  to like domestic services
and service  providers. However,  such treatment  may or may not be identical  to that applying  to domestic
firms, in recognition  of the  fact that identical  treatment  may  actually  worsen  the conditions  of competition
for foreign-based  firms (e.g. a requirement  for insurance  firms that reserves be held locally).
The introduction  of a market access  commitment  reflects  one of the distinguishing  characteristics
affecting  EC audiovisual  services,  products,  or service  providers,  in response  to corresponding  or comparable
actions  taken  by other  Members."
12 In contrast  to Article  VII  on Recognition  (see  below).
8of service markets: the fact that their contestability is frequently restricted by non-discriminatory
measures. The market access  article explicitly  covers  six such measures  that were felt to be of particular
importance. However, the market access obligation  overlaps with the national treatment  requirement,
as prohibited measures  may be discriminatory as well as non-discriminatory.  The overlap creates
potential for confusion and disputes.  Because national treatment and market access are not general
obligations, in the GATS context the schedules  of commitments  of Members are very important in
determining  the extent of the market access  opportunities  resulting from the Agreement. As discussed
further below, these schedules  are constructed  in such a manner that the liberalization  'dynamics' of the
GATS may turn out to be substantially  weaker than those of the GATT.
Other obligations  and disciplines
Other obligations  address issues such as transparency,  recognition  of licenses and certification,
payments and transfers, domestic regulation and the behavior of public monopolies.  Article III
(Transparency) requires all  Members to  establish enquiry points to  provide specific information
concerning any laws, regulations, and administrative  practices respecting services covered by the
Agreement. Article  VI (Domestic  Regulation)  requires  that Members  establish  disciplines  to ensure that
qualification  requirements, technical standards and licensing procedures are based on objective and
transparent criteria, are no more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the services
concerned, and do not constitute  a restriction on supply in themselves  (thiereby  possibly circumventing
a  specific commitment).  Article XI requires Members to  refrain from applying restrictions on
international transfers and payments for current transactions relating to their specific commitments.
Article VII (Recognition)  allows  for the establishment  of procedures  for (mutual)  recognition  of licenses,
education,  and/or experience  granted by a particular Member. It is noteworthy  in requiring  Members
to "afford adequate  opportunity"  for other Members  to negotiate  their accession  to an existing  bilateral
or plurilateral recognition  agreement. Monopoly  or oligopoly  supply of services is allowed  under the
GATS, but Governments  are required to ensure that such firms do not abuse their market power to
'nullify' any specific  commitments  relating  to activities  that fall outside  the scope of their exclusive  rights.
Many of the framework's rules and disciplines  apply  only to the extent specific  commitments  are
made.  This is a serious shortcoming, and is a consequence  of the positive list approach taken for
scheduling commitments.  Clearly one would want--and  expect--disciplines  regarding payments and
transfers to be general.  To the extent that other parties are willing to allow a country to maintain
restrictions,  a negative  list approach  would  have  allowed  for exemptions. But at least  the principle  would
be general, not specific.  Even worse is emphasis  put in Article VI (Domestic  Regulation)  that the
requirement  that "all measures of general application  affecting trade in services are administered  in a
reasonable, objective  and impartial manner" applies only "in sectors where specific commitments  are
undertaken"  (GATT, 1994, p. 333, emphasis  added).
The MFN, national treatment and market access obligations of the GATS do not extend to
9government procurement of services.  Negotiations on this issue are to be initiated within two years of
the entry  into force of the WTO.'3 This  greatly reduces the coverage  of the GATS as procurement
typically represents a significant share of total demand for many services--e.g.,  professional services,
consulting engineering, and construction.  The GATS also does not impose general disciplines on subsidy
practices, only subjecting subsidies to the Agreement's general obligations (i.e. transparency,  MFN and
dispute settlement).  Negotiations are also called for on  this topic, the time frame to be determined by
a future work program.  Article IX recognizes that business practices of service suppliers that have not
been granted monopoly or exclusive rights may restrain competition and thus trade  in services, but no
obligations are imposed regarding the scope and enforcement of competition policy.  Members are only
obliged  to supply publicly available non-confidential information of relevance to a competition-related
matter if so requested by another Member.
There are a number of articles of a 'safeguard'  nature, including Article X (Emergency Safeguard
Measures), Article XII (Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payments),  Article XIV (Exceptions)
and Article XXI (Modification of Schedules).  Article X allowing for possible industry-specific safeguard
actions  is largely a shell, calling for  further negotiations on the this topic within three years from the
entry into force of the WTO.  The balance of payments provision only applies to those services for which
specific commitments have  been undertaken.  It  requires that  such measures  be non-discriminatory,
temporary,  and  phased  out progressively  as the  invoking  Member's  balance  of  payments  situation
improves.'4 Article XIV on exceptions is similar to what is found in the GATT, providing Members with
the legal cover to take measures to safeguard public morals, order, health, security, consumer protection
and privacy.  It also allows for measures that violate national treatment if used to ensure equitable or
effective collection  of direct taxes,  or that violate  MFN  if resulting from  a bilateral  double  taxation
agreement.! 5 The  provision  on  modification  of  schedules  allows  'concessions'  (i.e.,  specific
13  The revised  GATT Government  Procurement  Agreement  was expanded  to include  services. However, this
is a plirilateral agreement that binds only signatories. The new Agreement  has 11 members, mostly OECD
countries (Israel and Korea are the only non-OECD  parties). Coverage  of procurement  of services  is subject to a
'double' positive list: only the procurement  by covered entities of services explicitly scheduled  in Annexes  are
subject to the Agreement's  rules, and then only insofar  as no qualifications  or limitations  are maintained  in the
relevant Annexes. A number  of countries made derogations  to commitments  on services specifying  that offered
services are covered only to the extent that other Parties to the Agreement  provide reciprocal  access to those
services.  The approach taken in the GATS regarding sectoral reciprocity was therefore also pursued in the
procurement  context.
"  As in the GATT  context, no recognition  is expressed  that import restrictions  are second-best  instruments  to
deal with balance  of payments difficulties.
'5  A Ministerial Decision included in the Final Act states that 'since measures necessary to protect the
environment  typically  have as their objective the protection  of human, animal,  or plant life or health, it is not clear
that there is a need to provide for .." an explicit 'environmental' exception.  The Committee  on Trade and
Environment  is given the tasks  of determining  whether  there is such  a need,  and examining  the relationship  between
trade in services and the environment.
10commitments)  to be withdrawn subject to negotiation and compensation. In the event that bilateral
negotiations  on compensation  are unsuccessful,  arbitration  is foreseen. Retaliation  will only  be authorized
in instances  where a Member  does not comply with arbitration. Finally, the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Body will be responsible  for GATS, as well as GATT and TRIPs.  It is noteworthy  in this regard that
retaliation  from goods to services  and vice-versa  is possible.
Developing  country-specific  provisions' 6
The GATS contains  no provisions similar to Part IV of the GATT on more favorable  treatment
of developing  countries  (special and differential treatment),  or to the (unilateral)  arrangements  for tariff
preferences that exist for merchandise trade flows (e.g.,  the Generalized System of  Preferences).
Although  Article XIX  allows  developing  countries  to offer fewer specific  commitments  than  industrialized
nations, this is not a right (or obligation). No developing  country (including  least developed  ones) has
been allowed  to become  a Member of the GATS without scheduling  at least one service sector. Other
provisions addressing developing country concerns include Articles IV (Increasing Participation of
Developing  Countries), III (Transparency),  and XV (Subsidies). Article IV states that increasing  the
participation  of developing  countries in world trade in services is to be facilitated  through negotiated
specific commitments  relating to: (1) access  to technology  on a commercial  basis; (2) the improvement
of access  to distribution  channels  and information  networks; and (3) the liberalization  of market access
in sectors of export interest to them.  On transparency, industrialized  nations are to establish  contact
points to facilitate the access  of developing country service suppliers to information  relating  to (1) the
commercial  and technical  aspects  of specific services; (2) requirements  for registration,  recognition,  and
obtaining of professional  qualifications;  and (3) the availability  of services technology. 1 7 Article XV
recognizes  the role of subsidies  in development  programs of developing  countries.
IV.  Specific Commitments  under the GATS
The core of the GATS are the specific  commitments. To a very large extent the impact  of the
GATS  depends on the commitments  that are made by Members. Negotiators  chose to pursue a 'hybrid'
of a positive and negative  list approach to scheduling  specific commitments. It is a positive list with
respect  to determining  sectoral  coverage  of market  access  and national  treatment  commitments;  a negative
list with regard to the maintenance  of measures  that violate  either national  treatment  or the market access
disciplines. Each Member  first decides (negotiates)  which service sectors will be subject to the GATS
market access  and national  treatment  disciplines. It then decides  (negotiates)  what measures  will be kept
16 For a more  detailed  discussion,  see UNCTAD  and World  Bank  (1994,  pp. 144-46).
'7  This provision  goes beyond  the requirement  to establish  enquiry  points contained  in Article III (on
transparency),  as those  simply  relate  to laws,  regulations,  decisions,  etc. that  affect  the supply  of services.  The
contact  points  for developing  countries  also cover  technical  matters.
11in placefor that  sector that violate  market  access  and/or  national  treatment,  respectively. Such limitations
and exceptions must be specified  by mode of supply.  As there are four modes of supply, there are
therefore eight opportunities  for GATS Members to avoid full application  of market access/national
treatment.  In addition to the specific commitments, countries also make 'horizontal' commitments.
These usually consist of a compilation  of laws and policies that restrict the use of a mode of supply by
foreign suppliers, independent  of the sector involved. A policy that is often scheduled  is an 'economic
needs' test--laws  or regulations  stipulating  that foreign service providers may contest a market only if
domestic  providers do not exist, or are unable to satisfy demand. Another  example  is a general licensing
or approval  requirement. In many instances  such horizontal  'headnotes' simply  involve  a restriction  on
the inward movement  of natural  persons. Table 3 illustrates  the format of the schedules. An entry of
'none' means a Member binds itself not to have any measures  that violate a market access or national
treatment  for a specific  sector/mode-of-supply  combination;  'unbound' implies that no commitments  are
made for a particular mode  of supply.' 8
Quantifying  the specific  commitments:  conceptual  issues
To  assess the schedules, a  quantitative measure is required that allows for  cross-country
comparisons.  In principle this requires a mapping of schedules  onto a scale that is invariant  across
countries. A first step could  consist of determining  the total value  of output represented  by a Member's
scheduled sectors as a proportion  of its GDP.  If country A schedules  only 5 % of it's service sector in
GDP terms, while country B schedules  15%, one can say that in an absolute  sense B has offered  three
times as much as A.  This requires the use of a common sectoral classification  and output data that is
consistent  with this classification. The Group of Negotiations  on Services (GNS) established a list of
services. This list--reproduced  in Annex 1--has  been used by Members  in scheduling  commitments. It
is based on the Central Product Classification  (CPC), with the exception  of communication  and financial
services, where a GNS-specific  breakdown  of activities was deemed necessary.
Unfortunately,  no countries  collect/report  disaggregated  data on the basis of the CPC, as it has
only been developed  recently. Many  countries  only report  GDP data for 5-10 service  sectors. Obtaining
the requisite output data for all GATS Members, even for the 11 major service categories  distinguished
in the GNS list, is a major endeavor. It has not been undertaken  in this paper. In part this is because
to be meaningful,  indicators  of sectoral  coverage  must incorporate  information  on the restrictiveness  of
the measures  that are maintained  with respect  to national  treatment  and/or market access. This is much
more important--but  also much more difficult--than  determining  the 'production  weights'.
'  Most  Members  do not list  horizontal  restrictions  on cross-border  supply  or consumer  movement.  It is not
clear  whether  this implies  that  they  have  bound  themselves.  It should  also  be mentioned  that  the  GATS  allows  for
'additional  commitments'  to be made  going  beyond  national  treatment/market  access. Virtually  no use  was  made
of this option,  and it will be ignored  in what  follows.
12Table 3: Format  and Example  of a Schedule  of Specific  Commitments
Commitments  Mode of  Conditions and limitations on market  Conditions and qualifications on national 1
supply  access  treatment
Horizontal  Cross-border  'None'  E.g.,  'None'  other than tax measures
commitments  supply  that result in differences in treatment
(i.e.,  across  with respect to R&D services.
all sectors)
Consumption  'None'  'Unbound'  for subsidies, tax incentives,
abroad  and tax credits.
Commercial  E.g.,  'Maximum foreign equity stake  E.g.,  'Unbound'  for subsidies.  Under
presence  is 49 percent'  Law x, approval  is required for equity
(FDI)  stakes over 25 percent; new investment
that exceeds y million.
Temporary  E.g.,  'Unbound except  for the  E.g.,  'Unbound  except for categories of
entry of  following:  Intra-corporate  transferees  natural persons  referred  to in the market
natural  of executives and senior managers;  access column
persons  specialist personnel for up to one
year; specialist personnel subject to
economic needs test for stays longer
than one year; service  sellers (sales
people) for  up to three months.
Specific  Cross-border  E.g.,  'Commercial  presence  required'  E.g.,  'Unbound'
commitment:  supply
E.g.,  I.A.d.  Consumption  E.g.,  'None'  E.g.,  'None'
Architectural  abroad
services  Commercial  E.g.,  '25 percent  of senior  E.g.,  'Unbound'
presence  management should be nationals'
(FDI)_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Temporary  E.g.,  'Unbound,  except as indicated in  E.g.,  'Unbound,  except as indicated in
entry of  Horizontal Commitments'  Horizontal Commitments'
natural
persons
To be able to compare schedules, commitments listing measures violating national treatment and
market  access obligations  must be  'discounted'  in  some way.  In most  cases no  information  exists
regarding the restrictiveness of the policies that are maintained  or the relative importance of modes of
supply on a sector-by-sector  basis,  taking into account the complementarities that may  exist between
various modes.  Some modes may be irrelevant because of technological factors.  For example, offering
zero restrictions on cross-border delivery or consumer movement in the context of retail banking services
is  of little value,  as  retail  banking products  usually  require  a  commercial  presence  to  be sold.  A
commercial presence in retail banking will in turn  require some movement of personnel (management,
technical support staff for data processing and information technology, etc.)  If there  are no limitations
on commercial presence,  but if there are restrictions  on movement of the required  personnel,  market
access may be severely limited.  Similarly, there may be no limitations on movement of personnel,  but
13restrictions on an activity (e.g., no deposit  taking allowed). Establishing  'mode-of-supply'  weights on
a sector-by-sector  basis is another monumental  task.9 A final problem concerns  quantification  of the
restrictiveness  of the horizontal  commitments,  which although applying to particular modes of supply
across all sectors, will affect particular  sectors differently.
No attempt  is made here  to determine  the  restrictiveness  or change  therein  of the  policies affecting
either scheduled  or non-scheduled  services.2' The focus is instead on scaling the sectoral conmmitments
of GATS Members with a view to 'quantifying'  two things: (1) the extent to which measures  have  been
bound; and (2) the share of sectors where the binding  relates to 'free trade'.  Abstracting  from the lack
of information  on the economic  impact  of measures  applied  to services,  even a qualitative  assessment  of
the liberalization  implied  by the specific  commitments  is not possible. Unfortunately,  the schedules  do
not reveal  to what extent they imply  liberalization,  if at all. It appears that virtually  all comnmitments  are
of a standstill nature, i.e., consist of a binding of (part of) the status quo.  This is the perception  of
negotiators, and in what follows this is assumed. 2'  Given that liberalization  in the sense of reducing
discrimination  and enhancing  market access  did not occur, the relevance  of 'weighted' sectoral  coverage
indicators increases,  as the key issue then is to determine  the extent to which Members  were willing to
bind the status quo.
For  purposes of  evaluating the  specific commitments, each  GATS Member's  specific
commitments  was entered into a spreadsheet. As there are 155 non-overlapping  service sectors in the
GNS classification  list (see Annex 1) and four modes  of supply, this implies 620 possible  commitments.
As commitments  apply to national  treatment  and market access  separately,  there are 1,240  data cells for
each Member.  Schedules  were submitted by 96 Members.  Two country groups were created for
comparison  purposes,  one for 78 'developing  countries', and one for 18 high income  countries  ('HIC').
The latter includes  OECD members, with the EU counted  as one, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South
Korea. 22 The 'developing  country' group includes  countries  with a wide range  of per capita incomes  and
substantial  variation  in service market size (GDP).  Because  of their relatively low per capita incomes
this group includes a number of East European  transition economies--the  Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic. Annex 3 lists GATS Members that submitted schedules,
defines  the membership  of the two groups, and reports the number  of commitments  by Member.
'9  In what follows  use is only made  of a subjective  weighing  scheme  to determine  the possible  impact  of--
sensitivity  to--incorporating  this into  the analysis.
20 The  GATS  schedules  can be used  to generate  some  information  on the relative  restrictiveness  of the  policy
regimes  maintained  by Members. Annex  2 reports  the results  of calculations  in this regard,  which  were  used  in
Brown,  Deardorff  and Stem  (1995).
21 As  mentioned  earlier,  the  only  area  where  liberalization  may  occur  is in financial  services,  where  discussions
are to be concluded  by the summer  of 1995.
22 The intention  was  to include  countries  that are, or are soon  expected  to be, OECD  members.
14Commitments  were classified into three  categories:  (1)  'None',  implying no  restrictions  are
applied on either market access or national treatment for a given mode of supply/sector;  (2) 'Unbound',
meaning no policies are bound for a given mode of supply/sector;  and (3)  'Other',  which in practice
implies that restrictions are listed for a mode of supply/sector.  These limitations (policies) are bound.
To allow calculation of the sectoral coverage of commitments, one of three numerical indicators (weights)
was allocated to each of the 'cells' of a Member's  schedule: a '1'  in all instances where 'None'  was stated
in the schedule for a sector/mode of supply (i.e.,  full market access/national  treatment is provided);  a
zero  in all  instances of where Member's  list  'Unbound'  for  a sector/mode  of supply;  and 0.5  in all
instances where specific restrictions or limitations are listed for a sector/mode of supply. 2 The value of
these indicators were chosen so as to allow aggregation across sectors and countries.  The higher the
number, the greater the implied extent of openness-cum-binding.24 Scaling commitments of 'unbound'
as zero,  and commitments  implying maintenance  of measures  violating national treatment or market
access as 0.5  reflects a perception that scheduling and binding has value,  no matter how restrictive the
policies that are maintained.
Tariff  bindings (schedules) are very  important  for the  functioning of the GATT because  they
establish a benchmark for the conditions of market access that a country commits itself to.  Under GATT
rules,  any measure taken or supported by  a government that has the effect of 'nullifying or impairing'
the 'concession'  implied by the tariff binding may give rise to a complaint to the GATT by a country that
perceives the measure having this effect.  That is, the binding not only restricts the possibility of raising
tariffs,  but also limits the possibility  of using measures that have an equivalent effect.  However, this
constraint only bites if tariffs are bound at applied rates.  In practice,  many developing countries have
23 If countries made  commitments  on sectors  that are not individually  mentioned  in the GNS  classification  list
(e.g., under Other Business  Services)  only one sector was recorded. The economic  significance  of the activities
mentioned  in such cases tend to be very minor. Members  sometimes  specify  that a commitment  applies  only to a
subset  of a disaggregated  GNS  item. A common  example  is under legal services,  where  foreign  providers  are often
limited to the practice  of--advice  on--home  country  law. In these cases it is assumed  that the commitment  applies
to the whole subsector, biasing sectoral coverage indicators upward.  Some GATS Members may schedule
commitments  for an aggregated  item, e.g., Construction  and  Related  Engineering  Services  instead  of all five of the
relevant  sub-sectors. In these cases it has been assumed  that the commitment  applies to all of the respective  sub-
sectors.  In a number of cases a mode of supply is technically not feasible.  A good example is cross-border
provision  of building  assembly  and installation  services. Most schedules  note this fact, stating that the mode of
supply  is "unbound  due to lack of technical  feasibility.  " Such  cases have  been  allocated  the number  '1' for coverage
calculation purposes  if other modes  of supply are unrestricted. In the case of nations with a federal structure, a
limitation  on a mode of supply may only apply for one of the sub-federal  entities (e.g., one or more states or
provinces). No account  of this has been taken in the calculations,  i.e., it is assumed  that the limitation  applies to
the whole  nation. This results  in a downward  bias of coverage. Affected  Members  include  Canada,  the European
Union and the U.S.
24 A value of 1 for a sector/mode  of supply  does not necessarily  imply  that foreign  service  providers  can freely
contest  a specific  market  through  a given  mode of supply. This  depends  on the applicable  horizontal  commitments.
In all cases where a reference  is made under the temporary entry mode of supply to a horizontal  commitment
(restriction),  a value of 0.5 was entered.
15bound  their tariffs at levels  that are substantially  higher  than  currently  applied rates. This greatly  reduces
the relevance  of binding,  but does not reduce their value  to zero. Martin and Francois (1994)  argue that
a binding that is above the applied rate is valuable  because  it reduces  the expected mean tariff.
Bindings in the services  context are less powerful  than tariff bindings under the GATT because
the market  access  article  captures  only a subset  of the universe  of measures. Many market access  barriers
are not 'caught' by the scheduling  exercise. Examples  include  labor  legislation,  tax regimes,  restrictions
on land availability,  ownership  or use, licensing and related fees, existence and reach of competition
policies, regulation  of monopolies,  judicial enforceability  of contracts, etc.  Such measures/policies  can
satisfy national  treatment, are not captured  by the market access  article, but can restrict the contestability
of markets.  Nonetheless,  binding  policies that violate  national  treatment  or market access  has value as
new measures  violating  these commitments  is no longer possible. Moreover, if a Member schedules  a
sector and later introduces  policies that are not prohibited  but have the effect of nullifying its specific
commitments,  it can be confronted  with a nonviolation  complaint. If the measure is determined  by the
Dispute Settlement  Body to have nullified  or impaired  a specific  commitment,  the Member affected  is
entitled to compensation,  and if agreement  cannot be reached,  to retaliation  (Art. XXIII, GATS).
Sectoral shares can be used as an indicator  of the 'openness' of countries if attention is limited
to those sectors where GATS Members offer free market access and full national treatment, i.e., no
limitations  are maintained  under the market  access  and national  treatment  columns. The sectoral  coverage
of such 'no restriction' commitments  in the country schedules  is perhaps the most obvious  quantifiable
focal point that was available  to negotiators. It also lends itself to a formula-type  approach. Negotiators
might have agreed that all offers should include at least x percent of their service sector (weighted  by
output)  for which  no restrictions  on market access  or national  treatment  would  be maintained. This would
have provided a clear benchmark, and a minimum  threshold  against which offers could be compared
across countries on an objective  basis.  Adoption  of such a criterion would still have allowed  countries
a substantial  amount of flexibility  concerning  the choice of the sectors to be included, but would have
ensured  that the 'minimum  acceptable'  offer was proportional  to country  size. In the event, 'quantitative
targets' were not used in the scheduling  exercise, leaving it to bilateral negotiations  to determine  what
was the minimum  acceptable  level of participation. Thus, instead  of pursuing a formula-based  approach
(used  to good  effect in later GATT  tariff-cutting  rounds  and in the agricultural  setting  through the concept
of reducing an aggregate measure of support), service negotiators resorted to the classic bid-offer
approach  to liberalization. More on this below.
Measures of sectoral coverage of specific commitments
Tables 4  through 8 report sectoral coverage indicators for 'HIC'  members and developing
countries. Market  access  (MA) and national  treatment  (NT) coverage  ratios are reported  in Table 4.  For
both MA and NT, three indicators were calculated.  First, the number of sector/mode of supply
combinations  (cells) where a commitment  was made.  Second, the 'average coverage' of the schedule
16defined  as the arithmetic  mean of the scale factors  allocated to each  cell (0 for 'unbound', 0.5 for bound
restrictions, and I  for 'no restrictions'.  Third, the share of  'no restriction' commitments  in (1) a
Members total commitments ('count');  and  (2) relative to  the  155 possible sectors of  the GNS
classification  list. The higher  the number,  the more 'liberal' the country. These ratios are conceptually
similar to NTB frequency  and coverage  indices.
'HIC' members  made commitments  of some kind for 53.3 percent of the GNS list, as compared
to 15.1 percent for developing  countries. Commitments  made by large developing  countries,  arbitrarily
defined as those with GDP of US $40 billion or more, were substantially  higher than the developing
country average, accounting  for 29.6 percent of the GNS list.  This largely reflects the fact that many
developing  countries  made very limited  commitments. Indeed, over one-quarter  of developing  countries
scheduled  less than 3 percent of the GNS list (i.e., 22 out of 78 countries).  Four of these countries
scheduled  only one of the 155  service sectors identified  on the GNS list; five others made  commitments
on only two subsectors. Countries  in the 'developing  country' group with the highest  number  of specific
conmmitments  include the Czech  Republic, Hungary, and the Slovak  Republic, each with more than 300
sectors/modes  of supply scheduled. Tables 7 and 8 and Annex 3 provide  more country-specific  data.
The average coverage of MA commnitments  for the 'HIC'  group is 40.6 percent; that for
developing  countries  9.4 percent;  and that for large developing  countries 17.1 percent.  If these figures
are related to the simple 'count' of the number of sectors where commitments  were made, it can be
observed  that 'HIC' countries  tend to be more liberal. That is, the proportion  of commitments  implying
either a '1' (no restriction)  or a 0.5 (some restriction,  but bound) is higher  than for developing  countries.
In Table 4 this can be seen in the third row, which divides the average 'coverage' of commitments  by
the 'count'.  This ratio for the large developing  country  group is almost  20 percentage  points lower than
for the 'HIC' group.  Some 56 percent of the 'HIC' group's commitments  imply 'no restrictions', as
compared to 36.7 percent for the group of large developing countries.  Although many developing
countries  made only a limited number  of specific commnitments,  many of these involve 'free' access: on
average, 47.3 percent of commitments  imply 'no restrictions'.  Table 4 also reports the importance  of
'no restriction' conunitments  relative  to the GNS list (i.e., the maximum  possible). Such commitments
by 'HIC' members  account  for 30.5 percent of the total.  For developing  countries  as a whole the figure
is 6.7 percent; for the large developing  country group the number is 10.9 percent.
Identical  ratios  were calculated  for NT commitments. A comparison  of commitments  on NT and
MA reveals that all countries  tend to be more liberal with regard to the former, and that the difference
between  country groups narrows  somewhat. There is a very high correlation  between  commitments  on
MA and NT.  This  can be seen from the last row of Table 4,  which reports the proportion of
commitments  where the value of a MA cell is equal to the corresponding  NT cell.  For 'HIC' the figure
is 89 percent, and for the other  countries  it is 96 percent. Finally, the next to last row of Table 4 reports
the  magnitude  of commitments  where 'no restriction' applies  to both MA and NT for a given  sector/mode
of supply.  The figure for 'HIC' is 28 percent, and that for the other countries, 6.4 percent.  These
17numbers vividly illustrate how far away GATS members are from attaining 'free trade'  is services, and
the magnitude of the task that remains.
Table 4: Sectoral  Coverage  of Specific  Conunitments  (percent)
'HIC'  |  All Other  Large
Members  Countries  Developing
____  ____  ___  ____  ___  ____  ___  ____  ___  ____  ___  __  _  ___  ____I  _  ____  ___  Nations
Market Access  (MA):
Average 'count'(sectors-modes  listed as a share of GNS total)  53.3  15.1  29.6
Average  coverage (sectors-modes  listed as a share of GNS  40.6  9.4  17.1
total, weighted by openness  and binding  scale factors)
Coverage/'count' (average coverage  as a share of the average  76.2  62.3  57.7
count)
'No restrictions' as a share of total offer made (no scaling)  56.4  47.3  36.7
'No restrictions' as a share of GNS total  30.5  6.7  10.9
National  Treatment  (NT):
Average 'count'(sectors-modes  listed as a share of GNS total)  53.3  15.1  29.6
Average coverage (sectors-modes  listed as a share of GNS  42.4  10.2  18.8
total, weighted  by openness and binding scale factors)
CoverageP'count'  (average  coverage as a share of average  79.5  67.5  63.5
count)
'No restrictions' as a share of total offer made (no scaling)  65.1  60.4  49.3
'No restrictions' as a share of GNS total  35.3  8.5  14.6
Memo items:
No restrictions  on MA and NT as a share of GNS total  28.0  6.4  10.0
Share of sectors (incl. unscheduled)  where coding for NT and  89.3  96.1  n.a.
MA is the same (as a share of GNS list).
The data reported in Table 4 do not take into account the relative importance of different service
activities in GDP (i.e.,  the 'size' of the various service markets), or the relative importance of countries
in the world  economy (i.e.,  the 'size'  of the different  GATS Members).  Table  5 reports  coverage
indicators for 'HIC'  and the other countries that incorporate an attempt to take these factors into account.
Table 5 pertains to MA commitments only, given that these tend  to be more restrictive  than those on
national treatment.  For  ease  of  comparison,  the first  row  repeats the unweighted average  sectoral
coverage ratios reported in Table 5.  The second row illustrates the importance of taking into account the
relative importance (size) of individual GNS service items (see Annex 1 for the output weights used; the
18same weights  were employed  for all countries). Sectoral coverage indicators  rise substantially. 'HIC'
coverage increases by  10.6 percentage points (or 26 percent) to  51.2 percent; developing country
coverage rises by  1.8 percentage points (or some 17 percent).  Thus, commitments  were made in
activities  that are of 'above average' importance  in GDP terms.  The third row in Table 5 relates the
specific  commnitments,  weighted by sectoral contributions  to GDP, to the global  market for services,  as
measured  by global GDP.  'HIC'  commitments  account for 49 percent of the global services market.
Those  by all developing  countries  represent  only  4.8 percent  of the world market, reflecting  the low share
of developing  countries in global GDP (estimated  at 13.7 percent).'
Table 5: Sectoral  Coverage  of Specific  Comnmitments  on Market  Access,
Weighted  by Sectoral  Contributions  to GDP and Country Shares  in Global  GDP
'HIC'  Developing  Group
1. Sectoral  coverage,  weighted  by 'restrictiveness'  40.6  9.4
2. Sectoral  coverage  scaled  by 'restrictiveness'  and GDP  weights  51.2  11.2
3. Sectoral  coverage  weighted  by restrictiveness,  sectoral  49.4  4.8
contributions  to GDP  and country  share  in world  GDP
Memo:  GDP  weights  82.0  13.7
Table 6 reports the results of coverage ratio calculations  incorporating  an effort to take into
account  the relative importance  of modes of supply  across service sectors as well as the share of service
sectors in GDP.  For this purpose each Member's commitments  were first aggregated  to the '2-digit'
GNS level (see Annex 1), and divided by the maximum  number of possible commitments  for each of
these sectors. Each of the four modes was then  given a weight, reflecting  a subjective  assessment  of the
relative importance  of the modes for each of the 2-digit sectors.  Adjustments  were also made to reflect
the fact that country offers for some service  sectors almost invariably  exclude  certain activities. Thus,
R&D service  offers tend to be limited to social science activity; primary and secondary  level education
services  to specialized  activities;  insurance  commnitments  usually  exclude  life insurance;  maritime  transport
excludes  cabotage  and liner traffic; air transport  commitments  are limited  to certain  support  services;  and
road transport  is usually limited to international  shipment. Annex 4 reports the weights  applied. Table
6 shows that incorporating  mode-of-supply  weights  and adjusting  for sector-specific  exclusions  has little
impact on the coverage ratios reported in Table 5.  The 'HIC' coverage measure declines somewhat,
falling from 51.2 percent to 48.5 percent. In contrast,  the coverage ratio for developing  countries  rises
slightly, increasing  from 11.2 to 11.4 percent. Coverage indicators  therefore do not appear to be very
sensitive  to incorporating  'mode of supply weights'.
5 Sources  for GDP  data were  the World  Development  Report  and the World  Bank  STARS  database.
19Table 6: Sectoral  Commitments  Adjusted  for Mode of Supply  Weights,  Proportion
of Service Sectors  Excluded  from Liberalization,  and Sector Weight  in GDP
'HIC' Group  Developing  countries
Market  access  commitments  48.5  11.4
National  treatment  commitments  53.0  12.6
Table 7 and 8 contain  country-specific  data for the 'HIC' and 'large developing  country' groups,
respectively. These Tables will not be described  in detail, but have been included  so as to give a flavor
of the variance  of commitments  across individual  countries. It is worth repeating  that sectoral coverage
indices are of only limited usefulness  from an economic  perspective,  as no account can be taken of the
actual restrictiveness  of the policy stance maintained  by different countries by sector/mode  of supply.
The least ambiguous  measure  in this respect is the 'no restrictions' coverage  ratio.'  This is 28 percent
on average for the 'HIC' group, and 6.4 percent on average for the other GATS Members.  Much
remains  to be done therefore. As it seems reasonable  to presume  that the 'easiest' sectors  were scheduled
by countries, these relatively low coverage indicators  suggest that for the foreseeable  future most trade
in services  will remain subject  to market access  and/or national  treatment restrictions.
The average coverage of sectoral commitments  is of course greater than the 'no restriction'
measure.  Weighted  by sectoral contributions  to GDP, it is about 50 percent for 'HIC' and 11 percent
for the developing  country group.  The average sectoral coverage ratio of the 'bottom' 50 developing
countries (which account for over 60 percent of the group in number) is substantially  below the group
average:  only 3 percent. As shown in Annex  3, four countries--Algeria,  Bangladesh,  Fiji, and Tanzania--
made commitments for only one sector; five others scheduled two sectors--Belize,  Burkina Faso,
Madagascar,  Sri Lanka, and Uganda. While many of these countries are small and have very low per
capita incomes--reducing  pressure from trading partners to schedule more sectors--this  by no means
justifies such a passive stance.
26 The  reciprocal  of the  'no restrictions'  ratio--with  services  weighted  by shares  in GDP--is  an indicator  of the
extent  to which  access  to services  markets  is 'affected'  by  policy.  It can  be seen  as a direct  analogue  of the  standard
NTB  frequency  indicator  if unweighted  by GDP  shares;  and the NTB  coverage  ratio  if weighted.
20Table 7: Specific Commitments by 'MIC' Countries (percentage)
Totals or  Australia  Austia  Canada  EU  Finland  Hong  Japan  Korea  Mexico  New  Norway  Singapore Sweden  Switzer-  Turkey  USA
Average  Kong  Zealand  land
330.4  Count (No. of conunitments)  360  412  352  392  328  200  408  311  252  276  360  232  320  400  276  384
Market  Access:
40.6  Average sectoral coverage  46.6  55.4  43.3  44.4  42.4  18.4  50.4  31.5  22.3  36.5  45.3  27.0  42.8  50.7  34.4  50.6
53.3  CountVGNS  list total  58.1  66.5  56.8  63.2  52.9  32.3  65.8  50.2  40.6  44.5  58.1  37.4  51.6  64.5  44.5  61.9
76.1  Av. Sec. Cov./[CountVGNS  list]  80.3  83.4  76.3  70.3  80.2  57.0  76.6  62.7  55.0  81.9  78.1  72.2  83.0  78.6  77.4  81.8
188.9  Count of  l's  (no restrictions)  222  283  186  169  202  90  230  134  79  189  210  118  215  247  168  244
56.4  No restrictions/count  61.7  68.7  52.8  43.1  61.6  45.0  56.4  43.1  31.3  68.2  58.3  50.9  67.2  61.8  60.9  63.5
National treatment:
42.4  Average sectoral coverage  49.2  55.6  46.0  49.6  51.6  7.3  47.9  37.3  25.9  36.9  47.5  25.0  43.0  51.4  38.1  55.8
53.3  CountVGNS  list total  58.1  66.5  56.8  63.2  52.9  32.3  65.8  50.2  40.6  44.5  58.1  37.4  51.6  64.5  44.5  61.9
79.5  [CountVGNS  list ]/Av. Sec. Cov.  84.7  83.6  81.1  78.4  97.6  22.8  72.8  74.3  63.7  83.0  81.8  66.8  83.3  79.6  85.7  90.1
218.7  Count of  l's  (no restrictions)  257  287  220  233  317  41  199  187  124  182  237  152  217  251  213  324
65.1  No restrictions/count  71.4  69.7  62.5  59.4  96.6  20.5  48.8  60.1  49.2  65.9  65.8  65.5  67.8  62.8  77.2  84.4
MA and NT comparisons:
1.2  No. of NT I's/No.  of MA I's  1.2  1.0  1.2  1.4  1.6  0.5  0.9  1.4  1.6  1.0  1.1  1.3  1.0  1.0  1.3  1.3
173.4  No. of matched l's:  MA=NT=1  219  268  180  163  199  31  155  133  78  166  204  115  207  241  154  218
51.4  Matched Is/count  60.8  65.0  51.1  41.6  60.7  15.5  38.0  42.8  31.0  60.1  56.7  49.6  64.7  60.3  55.8  56.8
28.0  Matched Is/GNS total  35.3  43.2  29.0  26.3  32.1  5.0  25.0  21.5  12.6  26.8  32.9  18.5  33.4  38.9  24.8  35.2
18826  GDP (S billion)  295  185  494  6662  94  78  3671  296  329  41  113  46  221  241  100  5920
81.6  World GDP share  1.3  0.8  2.1  28.9  0.4  0.3  15.9  1.3  1.4  0.2  0.5  0.2  1.0  1.0  0.4  25.7
38.3  MA cov. weighted by GDP  0.6  0.4  0.9  12.8  0.2  0.1  8.0  0.4  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.4  0.5  0.1  13.0
NOTE:  'HIC'  group  averages  include  Iceland  and
Liechtenstein
21Table 8: Specific Commiitmnents  by the Largest  Developing Country  GATS Members  (percentage)
Total or  Argentina  Brazil  Chile  China  Colombia  India  Indonesia  Israel  Malaysia  Pakistan  Philip-  Poland  South  Thailand  Vene-
pines  Africa  zuela
Average  _  __:
183.7  Count (No. of conmiitments)  208  156  140  196  164  132  140  180  256  108  160  212  288  260  156
Market  Access:
17.1  Average sectonal coverage  26.4  7.5  9.8  13.9  13.9  7.2  13.7  19.1  28.1  8.2  21.1  21.5  32.6  19.4  13.6
29.6  CountVGNS  list total  33.6  25.2  22.6  31.6  26.5  21.3  22.6  29.0  41.3  17.4  25.8  34.2  46.5  41.9  25.2
57.6  Av. Sec. Cov./[CountVGNS  list]  78.6  29.8  43.2  44.1  52.4  33.7  60.7  65.8  68.0  47.2  81.9  62.7  70.1  46.2  53.9
67.3  Count of l's  (no restrictions)  136  19  36  42  62  10  42  90  100  30  102  79  150  59  53
36.6  No restrictions/count  65.4  12.2  25.7  21.4  37.8  7.6  30.0  50.0  39.1  27.8  63.7  37.3  52.1  22.7  34.0
National treatment:
18.8  Average sectoral coverage  26.4  8.5  10.7  14.6  13.2  8.4  10.8  19.2  33.4  8.2  24.1  28.3  35.2  26.8  13.6
29.6  Count/GNS list total  33.6  25.2  22.6  31.6  26.5  21.3  22.6  29.0  41.3  17.4  25.8  34.2  46.5  41.9  25.2
63.3  Av. Sec. Cov./[Count/GNS list)  78.6  34.0  47.5  46.2  50.0  39.4  47.9  66.1  80.9  46.8  93.4  82.8  75.9  63.9  53.9
90.5  Count of l's  (no restrictions)  136  27  48  54  62  31  30  91  166  38  144  164  182  132  53
49.3  No restrictions/count  65.4  17.3  34.3  27.6  37.8  23.5  21.4  50.6  64.8  35.2  90.0  77.4  63.2  50.8  34.0
MA and NT comparisons:
1.5  No. of NT  's/No.  of MA I's  1.0  1.4  1.3  1.3  1.0  3.1  0.7  1.0  1.7  1.3  1.4  2.1  1.2  2.2  1.0
64.3  No. of matched l's  (MA=NT=1)  136  17  36  37  62  10  28  89  90  30  91  79  149  58  53
35.0  Matched I  s/count  65.4  10.9  25.7  18.9  37.8  7.6  20.0  49.4  35.2  27.8  56.9  37.3  51.7  22.3  34.0
10.4  Matched Is/GNS total  21.9  2.7  5.8  6.0  10.0  1.6  4.5  14.4  14.5  4.8  14.7  12.7  24.0  9.4  8.6
2611  GDP ($ billion)  229  395  41  506  49  242  126  70  57  473  52  84  115  110  61
11.3  Share in world GDP  0.99  1.71  0.18  2.19  0.21  1.04  0.55  0.30  0.25  2.05  0.23  0.36  0.50  0.48  0.27
1.6  MA cov. (weighted by GDP)  0.26  0.13  0.02  0.31  0.03  0.08  0.08  0.06  0.07  0.17  0.05  0.08  0.16  0.09  0.04
22Figure  1 plots the relationship between per capita income and  number of  sectors where
commitments  were made.  It reveals that although a number of poor countries scheduled  a significant
number  of sectors, most did not. It is unclear why coverage  ratios (unscaled)  are not close  to 100  percent
for all Members. The mere fact that so much of the service sector was not scheduled  must be counted
against the GATS.  The 'cost' of making specific conmmitments  is after all modest, even for those
countries  that do not favor liberalization,  as any measure violating  national  treatment  or market access
may be scheduled. This argument  applies a fortiori to those countries that either desire to liberalize
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Figure 1: Relationship  Between  Per Capita  Income  and Specific  Commitments
Table 9 reveals  there is a fair amount  of variance  in the sectoral  coverage  of 'HIC' commitments.
The fewest  commitments  were  made in sectors such  as land, water  and air transport,  postal services,  basic
telecoms,  R&D, education,  health,  social, and recreation  and social  services. Of these 'sensitive' sectors,
developing  countries  have a potential  export interest in the last three, insofar as most 'personal' services
are included  in these categories  (none  of which were scheduled). But the coverage  of business  services,
computer-related  services, and construction is quite high.  These sectors cover many activities where
developing  countries  have an export potential.
23Table 9: Commitments by Sector
Sector  Number GNS  Average  Number  Commitments/GNS Items per
items and modes  of Commitments  Sector
of supply
'HIC'  'LDC'  'HIC'  'LDC'
Construction  20  13.6  2.9  68.1  14.2
Motor Vehicle Repair  4  2  0.3  50.7  6.7
Wholesale Trade  8  4.9  0.5  61.8  6.1
Retail Trade  8  4.9  0.7  61.8  8.9
Hotel/Restaurants  4  3.3  2.7  81.9  68.3
Land Transport  40  10.9  2.0  27.2  5.0
Water Transport  48  6.1  2.6  12.7  5.5
Air Transport  20  4.5  1.3  22.4  6.6
Auxiliary Transport  20  5.7  1.1  28.5  5.7
Postal Services  4  1.4  0.6  35.4  15.2
Basic Telecom  28  2.2  1.1  7.8  4.1
Value-added Telecom  28  21.1  4.6  75.4  16.5
Financial Services  60  35.4  11.7  59.0  19.5
Real Estate Services  8  3.7  0 3  46.2  3.8
Rental Activities  20  10.9  1.0  54.6  5.2
Computer-related  20  15.6  4.3  78.1  21.4
R&D Services  12  4.4  1.0  37.0  8.3
Business Services  108  62.9  11.3  58.3  10.5
Refuse Disposal  16  9.2  1.0  57.6  6.3
Education  20  6.3  1.0  31.3  5.2
Health  and Social  24  5.4  1.8  22.3  7.6
Recreation/Culture  48  14.9  4.3  31.1  9.0
Although  market access commitments  by OECD countries tend be restrictive with respect to
activities  where developing  countries  have  a comparative  advantage--i.e.,  both low- and high-skill labor-
intensive  activities that require either temporary entry or establishment/work  permits--nothing  is to be
gained  from a 'retaliatory' policy stance. The majority of countries  are simply  too small to be able to
influence  market access policies of large traders.  Non-liberalization  by trading partners reduces the
potential gains from liberalization,  but by no means eliminates  them.  The Annex on the movement  of
24natural persons--currently  the only mode-of-supply-specific  part of the GATS--only  requires  that natural
persons  who are service suppliers or employed  by a service  supplier of a Member  be allowed  to provide
services  in accordance  with  the terms  of specific  commitments  relating  to entry  and temporary  stay of such
persons. The extent to which labor movement  is allowed is therefore completely  dependent  on what is
specified  in the schedules. Specific  restrictions  on labor movement  may be horizontal  in nature (e.g. a
domestic  means test for all incoming labor) or sector-specific. Most Members only allow  for entry of
specialists  and higher  level management  staff, significantly  curtailing  the  scope for cross-border  (i.e. non-
establishment  related) trade in services.  Similarly, a lack of general disciplines on discriminatory
licensing  practices  involving  citizenship  or permanent  residency  requirements  can be expected  to weaken
the GATS' impact  on trade in professional  services.  '
Most  of the  potential  gains for developing  countries  associated  with GATS  membership  will result
from liberalizing  access  to their own markets. There is substantial  evidence  that many  of the constraints
that reduce the economic  efficiency  of service industries  are "home  grown," in that governments  have
not always  pursued  the appropriate  policies  (UNCTAD  and World Bank, 1994). Thus, policy measures
should focus on augmenting  domestic  productive  capacity, increasing  quality, establishing  a reputation
for reliable  supply, etc. Services  are often intermediate  inputs into the production  of goods, so that the
availability  of higher quality and/or lower cost services  will increase  the output  of goods  and make them
more competitive  on world markets. The level of specific commitments  suggests  that govermnents  did
not grasp the opportunity  to bind the status quo, let alone liberalize access to service marlkets. The
question  then is whether substantial  liberalization  will occur in the future.
V.  Possible Incentive  Effects of the Framework
Progressive  liberalization  is a central  objective  of the GATS. How well will the structure  put in
place perform in expanding  the coverage  of bindings  and inducing  substantial  liberalization  of access  to
service  markets? Concerns can be expressed  regarding both dimensions. Problems  include  the lack of
transparency,  sector-specificity,  the modalities  of scheduling, and the limited number  of generic rules.
All of these reflect  the structural weaknesses  of the GATS.
The GATS  does not do anything  near enough to further the goal of transparency,  which should
be a fundamental  objective  of any multilateral  agreement. No information  is generated  on sectors, sub-
sectors and activities in which no commitments  are scheduled--most often the sensitive ones where
27 A  Ministerial  Decision  taken  in Marrakesh  established  a negotiating  group  on movement  of natural  persons
to undertake  negotiations  on further  liberalization  of such  movement  for the  purpose  of supplying  services. This
group  is to conclude  its talks  within  six months  of the  entry  into  force  of the WTO. Although  ongoing,  it is not
likely  that  much  will  emerge  to give  developing  countries  greater  access  to  potential  export  markets,  or to strengthen
general  disciplines  applying  to this mode  of supply.
25restrictions  and discriminatory  practices  abound. A commitment  consisting  of the single  word 'unbound'
(see Table  3) does not impart  any information,  except  that the government  does not want to have its hands
tied in any way, and that the regulatory stance is therefore likely to be restrictive.  This lack of
transparency  is a serious shortcoming  when  one considers  the nature and origin of impediments  to trade
in services  (i.e. regulatory  barriers at both the national  and sub-national  levels). A negative  list approach
would have significantly  enhanced  transparency. Even if this would have resulted in country-specific
'phone books' of non-conforming  measures,  that would be no bad thing.  Currently there is simply no
comprehensive  cross-country  source of information  for service  providers  concerning  the regulatory  regime
that applies.  If Members remain firmly committed  to the positive list approach, agreement  should be
sought  that all Members  compile  and publish  (through  the  WTO Secretariat)  this information,  on a sector-
by-sector basis, within  an agreed upon time frame. Without such transparency,  negotiations  are made
more difficult, and will be driven primarily  by powerful  export interests.
There is also a  great deal of variance across countries regarding the 'transparency' of the
commitments  themselves. Some Members  have clearly invested  substantial  effort in listing all relevant
applicable  laws and regulations  that may limit access. Others simply  make reference  to a limitation,  but
do not specify  the applicable  laws.  Limitations  that are mentioned  in a schedule  may be rather vague,
and therefore open to interpretation  (indeed, require it). 28 Dispute  settlement  in the GATS is therefore
likely to revolve around interpretation of country schedules.  Ambiguity, in conjunction with the
importance  of the schedules,  suggests that the number of cases may be substantial. Overlap between
national  treatment  and market  access  obligations  may  prove to be particularly  problematical  in this regard,
as any market access restriction will violate national treatment if it applies only to foreign service
providers.  For example, a Member may have made a  'no restriction' commitment  under national
treatment, but scheduled  a limitation  on the maximum  equity share that can  be held by a foreign  supplier
choosing to establish. Given the inclusion  of both commitments  in the GATS, greater care should have
been taken to ensure that the two commitments  are distinct.
The structure of the GATS implies that negotiations  in the services area were (and will be)
sectoral, and can be expected  to be driven  very much  by the concerns  and interests of the major players
in each industry. At some level a sectoral approach  is probably  unavoidable,  given the widely differing
regulatory regimes across countries and sectors.  But to  foster MFN-based liberalization, sectoral
agreements  should  be firmly embedded  in a framework  of general  rules and disciplines. The emphasis
28 It is sometimes  not  even  clear  what  limitations  apply  to what  sector  or sub-sector.  Some  schedules  omit  to
mention  a specific  mode  of supply  for a given  sector. Members  at times  also diverge  from  the  positive/negative
list approach  to scheduling,  instead  opting  for a positive/positive  list  approach.  That  is, the sectors  to which  the
market  access  article  and national  treatment  principle  apply  are listed, and then for each mode  of supply  it is
specified  what  is offered  (as  opposed  to a listing  of the  limitations  on national  treatment  or market  access  that are
maintained).  This  reduces  transparency  further,  by not  identifying  all the  policies  that  conflict  with  market  access
and/or  national  treatment.  As noted  previously,  it is also  not  clear  whether  non-listing  of horizontal  measures  on
modes  of supply  implies  a binding  of 'no restrictions'.
26put on 'absolute' sectoral reciprocity may prove to be especially  troublesome insofar as incremental
liberalization  becomes  less feasible  and the scope for cross-issue  tradeoffs  is reduced. The scope  for turf
fights between  regulatory agencies  may be enhanced,  making  it more difficult  to take an economy-wide
perspective  and make  trade-offs  across issues. The positive  list approach  may also make it more difficult
for a government to add sectors to its schedule.  Those industries affected can argue against their
inclusion: "why us and not them" (referring to other sectors that are excluded). Under a negative  list
approach  each industry seeking  'special treatment' is put in the position  of having  to justify why  the rules
should  not apply  to it, even  though they apply  to everyone  else; under a positive  list the government  must
be ready to confront each industry that it seeks to subject to multilateral disciplines.  As mentioned
previously,  it is likely that the 'easy' sectors will have been included  first, leaving the more 'sensitive'
sectors to be dealt with in the future.
The scheduling  of conmmitments  by modes of supply  may further distort incentives  and resource
allocation by creating the opportunity for biasing incentives  towards a particular mode of supply.
Somewhat  ironically,  given  the  early resistance  by many  developing  countries  to discussing  establishment-
related  matters in the GNS, the commitments  lodged  by these countries  under the conmmercial  presence
mode of supply tend to be the least restrictive. This is perhaps not surprising, as this mode appears  to
generate  the most in terms of local content/domestic  value added. However, by being more restrictive
on other modes, firms may  be given an incentive  to engage  in 'tariff-hopping'  type investment. Indeed,
commitments on commercial presence may amount to disguised trade-related investment measures
(TRIMs), insofar as foreign service providers are effectively  compelled  to use this mode and in the
process are subjected to measures that violate either market access or national treatment. At the same
time, commitments  relating  to commercial  presence may be subject to the right to maintain  or impose
authorization and/or screening procedures (i.e., horizontal restrictions), and the criteria or specific
measures that underpin such procedures may not necessarily be clearly defined or specified in the
schedule.
Another potentially  perverse incentive  created  by the combination  of specific commitments  and
the positive list approach is that Members may be induced to adopt policies that are in principle
prohibited, and then seek to negotiate  these  away over time. Policies  in many  countries  may  be consistent
with market access  and national  treatment obligations. Rather  than locking  this in, the GATS allows  for
the future imposition  of restrictions (creation of 'negotiating  chips').  Although the non-generality  of
national treatment was probably unavoidable,  the impact of the GATS would have been substantially
greater if it had been required that the status quo be bound for all sectors.  The market access article is
a step in the right direction,  but it also should have been a general obligation  subject  to a negative  list
of exemptions. Moreover, it is too weak. Market  access  is not defined  in the GATS, there being instead
a finite list of measures  prohibited in principle, leaving  others that have similar effects  untouched. The
Article would have been  strengthened,  and dispute  settlement  facilitated,  if the words "or measures  with
equivalent  effect" had been added. EU experience  has demonstrated  the importance  of this in enforcing
the Treaty of Rome.  Language  to this effect would have allowed  violation  complaints  to be brought.
27The absence  of such wording puts all the weight on nonviolation,  a much weaker  mechanism.
To the extent that market access restrictions are maintained,  concern can also be expressed
regarding  their possible impact on the MFN obligation. Given that the in principle prohibited market
access  restrictions  are quantitative  in nature--limits  on the number  of firms, their assets, or their turnover-
-there appears  to be a 'natural' incentive  to negotiate  increases  in market access  in quantitative  terms as
well.  Suppose  that currently only three foreign  firms are established,  and are restricted  to four lines of
activity.  Trade negotiators  might then seek to increase the number  of firms and/or lines of permitted
activity.  That is, the GATS' approach to  liberalization has a built-in incentive for the reciprocal
negotiation  of 'VIEs'.  If a country  permits a few additional  firms into a sector, the nationality  of these
firms may matter, in that incentives  may exist  to 'ensure' that firms from certain countries  obtain access.
Market access/share  criteria may result in managed  trade, as 'voluntary import/investment  expansion'
agreements  can easily be inconsistent  with MFN.
implications  for developing  countries
The GATS imposes few limitations on national policy, only requiring that no discrimination
across alternative  sources of supply  occurs.  It allows  parties to implement  policies that are detrimental
to-or  inconsistent  with--economic  efficiency. A good example  is the Article specifying  the conditions
under which measures  to safeguard  the balance-of-payments  may be taken, such measures  rarely being
efficient. It can also be noted  that the GATS does not require a participating  country to alter regulatory
structures,  or to pursue an active  antitrust  or competition  policy. Liberalization  of trade and investment
may need to be augmented  by regulatory  change (frequently  deregulation)  and an effective  competition
policy in order  to  increase the efficiency of service sectors such as finance, transportation, and
telecommunications.  If liberalization  is simply  equated  with increased  market access  for (certain)  foreign
suppliers, this may  have little effect  in markets that are characterized  by a lack of competition. The main
result will then simply be to redistribute  rents across firms.
Much more importantly,  many  developing  countries  have been  able to accede  to the GATS with
only minimal commitments. The adoption  of a positive list approach  was partly due to arguments by
developing  countries that a negative  list was too resource intensive  to be feasible within the time frame
envisaged  (completion  of the round by end-1990). Acceptance  of this argument, in conjunction  with the
willingness  to accept  very little in the way of scheduled  specific  commitments  and the fact that a number
of the framework's  rules apply only if specific  commitments  are made, implies that the GATS has very
few implications  for the majority  of developing  countries. Indeed,  its impact  may be negative. The non-
generality of national treatment, and the sector-specificity  of market access  commitments  reduces the
value of the GATS to governments  seeking  to liberalize. Lobbies  that oppose liberalization  cannot be
told that GATS  membership  implies  national  treatment  for all sectors. Instead,  it must explicitly  list each
and every  sector to ensure that national  treatment and market access  obligations  will apply. This clearly
makes matters much more difficult  for governments  that 'need' an external  justification for resisting
28protectionist  pressures.
The GATS  does not emulate  the GATT and embody  special  and differential  treatment  provisions.
But it continues  the GATT tradition  of putting  very little pressure on small and poor developing  countries
in particular  to fully  participate,  as these  have little  to offer in the  multilateral  mercantilistic  game of 'give
and take'.  However, these are arguably the countries where a liberal policy stance is crucial.  These
countries  have largely been left to pursue liberalization  unilaterally;  the GATS allows them to lock this
in if so desired, but does not do much to help achieve  a liberal policy environment.
VI.  Options for Fixing  the Framework
There are many challenges  that need to be addressed  by negotiators  if the GATS is to become
an effective  and therefore credible instrument  of multilateral  liberalization. Agreement  on disciplines in
the areas  of subsidies,  procurement,  and safeguards  must be reached. The sectoral  coverage  of the GATS
must be greatly expanded  through binding of all measures violating  national treatment/market  access.
The set of generally applicable rules and disciplines must grow significantly,  and the weight of the
specific  commitments  reduced.  The approach  taken towards scheduling  commitments  in the Uruguay
round needs to be critically assessed  to determine whether it will be conducive  to achieving  significant
liberalization  of service markets in the future.
The first order of business  should  be to explore whether  a more general  approach--similar  to that
of the EU, NAFTA,  or the Australia-New  Zealand  Closer Economic  Relations  Trade Agreement--might
be feasible. 29 Given  that negotiators  were well aware  of the approaches  taken  towards liberalizing  service
markets  in these regional  contexts--i.e.,  across-the-board  disciplines  for all modes of supply  with limited
sector-specific  exclusions--presumably  this is not an option.  But it should be possible to move further
towards  this model. Deardorff (1994)  and Snape (1994)  have argued  that the key requirement  is to make
national  treatment a general obligation. Deardorff suggests  that the quid pro quo for this could be that
each country  is allowed  to levy taxes--perhaps  prohibitive--on  foreign providers. These taxes would be
scheduled,  and become the focal point for future liberalization  efforts.  Snape (1994)  also proposes the
adoption  of general  obligations  prohibiting  all forms  of discrimination  against  foreign  suppliers,  but rather
than  tariffication  suggests  seeking  agreement  on a negotiated  set of legitimized  measures  that may  be used
to reduce  the contestablity  of any service market for foreign suppliers. Future negotiations  could then
focus  on these measures.
The current wording of the GATS implies that tariffication  should pertain to existing market
access  restrictions  as well as limitations  on national  treatment. Both Deardorff  and Snape  focus  on classic
29 See Hoekman  and Sauve  (1994)  for a description  of these  arrangements.
29national treatment, i.e., discrimination againstforeign suppliers.  Tariffication of discriminatory measures
appears  to be straightforward  in principle, as each government  can simply set a tax rate.  In practice,
however, difficulties  may arise in determining  the nationality (origin) of firms, and in constraining
'opportunistic'  behavior. Member schedules  suggest  that tariffs are likely to be lower on establishment
than on cross-border  trade, thus fostering establishment. Because  origin rules will invariably  exempt
ventures with some degree of local ownership, policies can be expected  to favor joint venture-based
establishment. This is not much  of a problem  insofar  as the current incentive  structure  does this already.
However, it is important  that tariffication  not make  the policy stance  more restrictive. This may easily
happen, as no one knows what the tariff equivalent of the status quo is.  In many instances policy towards
foreign providers currently may be consistent with national treatment, but countries have avoided
scheduling  (binding)  this state of affairs. To the extent that entry is in principle  free (the applied policy
is liberal) this should not be supplanted  with discriminatory  taxation  of foreign providers.  If the status
quo is relatively liberal, this should be reflected  in tax rates that are imposed. Thus, not only should
established  foreign  firms be grandfathered  from any 'tariffication' if they are presently  granted national
treatment, no tariffication  should be permitted  in such sectors. The argument  for tariffication  is greatly
weakened  if this cannot  be achieved. Its main rationale  is to harness  the mercantilist  instincts/approaches
developed in the GATT context to liberalizing service markets.  If conditions are already liberal,
tariffication  is counterproductive  and may be captured by--or create--vested  interests that will oppose
future  reductions. 0 It may therefore be preferable  to pursue the proposal made by Snape (1994)  to seek
to agree to a limited  set of policies that may  be applied  by GATS  members  to discriminate  against  foreign
suppliers. What those measures  might be is unclear, however, as illustrated  by lengthy discussions  in
the GNS.  Clearly on the national treatment side a tax of some sort is the main option, leading to
tariffication-type  issues.
Before  abandoning  the tariffication  proposal, it can  be noted  that it might  be more  readily applied
to deal with non-discriminatory  market access restrictions. There is no reason why potential domestic
entrants would not be willing to pay an 'entry fee' to contest a market currently subject to QR-type
barriers.  One 'tariffication' option could be to periodically  auction off such QRs.  This would appear
most appropriate  for regulated  monopolies  and for self-regulated  industries  where there is a numerusfixus
constraint on new entry (e.g., certain  professions). There is no problem with determining  origin if the
measures are applied on a nondiscriminatory  basis.  The focus can then simply be on all potential
entrants. Another  possibility  for regulated  activities  is to exchange  price reduction  commitments,  based
on comparisons  of prices charged  by a supplier  in a market with the average  of several  of the lowest cost
suppliers of the service  concerned. This requires  a substantial  amount of information,  and may not be
feasible for some sectors.  However, multilateral  scrutiny  of pricing policies could be sought, with an
agreement  to extend the WTO's dispute settlement  mechanism  to the pricing practices of monopolies.
'  Thus  the  difference  with  agriculture,  where  stratospheric  bindings  were  considered  an  acceptable  price  to pay
to get this  sector  back  into  the GATT,  is that the  current  policy  regime  in many  service  sectors  may  be much  less
distorted.
30This could help get 'around' existing legal constraints on the reach of competition law in  many
jurisdictions.
Realism  suggests  that proposals for improving  GATS build upon the existing  structure as much
as possible.  Much can be done if the willingness  to do so is there.  The basic elements have been
identified earlier:  (1) adopt a negative list approach to scheduling  for transparency  purposes, with a
transition  period  that gives  Members  sufficient  time to do this; 3' (2) eliminate  all overlap  between  national
treatment  and market  access,  ensuring  that the latter  applies  only to non-discriminatory  measures;  (3) seek
to agree to horizontal  disciplines  on modes of supply, and eliminate  mode-of-supply-specific  limitations
in the schedules; (4) expand  the reach of the market access article by including  the term "or measures
with equivalent  effect";  (5) convert  QR-like  market access  restrictions  to price-based  equivalent  measures
by auctioning them off, thus ensuring that MFN and national treatment are satisfied; (6) make all
framework disciplines generally applicable by  eliminating all  instances where rules are currently
conditional  upon the scheduling  of specific  commitments;  and (7) agree to a formula-based  approach  for
future liberalization  and expansion  of the sectoral  coverage  of the  GATS. GATT experience  suggests  that
progress in MTNs is facilitated  if negotiators  use a quantifiable  focal point. A 'formula' approach  could
help negotiations  to make  progress. A target could  be established  for the share of each Member's  service
sector that should be scheduled  with 'no restrictions' and for the share of the GNS list that should be
bound (scheduled).
Discussions  and disciplines  in the GATS context  appear  to be on a sector-specific  track. Sectoral
disciplines may make sense in principle insofar as necessary to take into account idiosyncracies  of
particular sectors. But the current format of the schedules  allows for too much  discretion  and ambiguity.
Sectoral agreements  should  be in the nature of annexes  that extend  or complement  generally  applicable,
common  rules. These  general  disciplines  should pertain to modes of supply, establishing  general ground
rules.  Elimination of the mode of supply criterion in the specific commitments may be relatively
straightforward. Nothing  in the GATS  compels  Members  to schedule  commitments  by mode of supply. 32
The horizontal  commitments  already pertain to the four modes of supply, independent  of sector.  What
is required is that horizontal  commitments  no longer  consist of a positive  list of bound policies, but are
transformed  into  a negative  list of policies  that are inconsistent  with in principle  generally  applicable  rules
and disciplines  for each of the modes of supply. A model that could be emulated  in this connection  is
the one pursued in the NAFTA, where generic disciplines  were negotiated  for modes of supply.  This
is ambitious, of course, and may well be feasible only if goods and services are treated symmetrically
(as they are in the NAFTA). Developing  commnon  disciplines  on investment  in the WTO, applying  to
goods and services, should therefore be a matter of some urgency.
3' The  offer  of grant-based  financial  assistance  for  low-income  developing  countries  can  greatly  facilitate  this.
32 Article  XX  of GATS  (Schedules  of Specific  Comnmitments)  states  that  separate  commitments  must  be made
for national  treatment  and for market  access,  but does  not require  that  this be by mode  of supply.
31Outstanding  Issues: Subsidies, Safeguards,  and Procurement
Space constraints prohibit a detailed discussion  of the outstanding issues that remain on the
immediate  negotiating  agenda. 33 All three issues are very important, and the disciplines  that are agreed
will influence  the effectiveness  of the GATS as an instrument for binding policies and promoting
liberalization.  Without  subsidy  disciplines  the scope  for contesting  markets  that have  been scheduled  may
be limited. Similarly, if safeguard  actions are relatively  easy to implement,  specific commitments  may
lose much of their impact. Expanding  the reach  of the GATS to government  procurement  is particularly
important,  as the rules and procedures  that are negotiated  will help determine  the potential for growth
in developing  country  exports of services. In contrast  to most of the other Tokyo Round  codes--e.g.,  the
agreements  on technical  barriers  to trade (standards),  import  licensing,  customs  valuation,  subsidies,  and
antidumping-the  Tokyo  round  Government  Procurement  Agreement  (GPA)  could  not  be
'multilateralized'.  With the reintroduction of agriculture and textiles and clothing into the GATT,
procurement  has therefore  become  the major 'hole' in the coverage  of the GATT and the GATS. As far
as services are concerned, a key issue here will be to ensure consistency  with the GPA, which was
extended to services in the Uruguay round.  Noteworthy  in this regard is that the GPA makes no
distinctions  between  modes  of supply. Indeed,  it requires  signatories  not to discriminate  on the basis of
mode of supply. This provides another reason  to eliminate  the mode  of supply distinction  in the specific
commitments. However, as noted previously, the fact that the GPA was somewhat 'infected' by the
GATS through the introduction  of sectoral non-application  and reciprocity  conditions  is troubling.
VII.  Concluding  Remarks
The GATS is the first multilateral agreement  pertaining  to policies affecting  trade in services.
As such it is not surprising to find that the 'newness'  of the topic is reflected  in the minimal  liberalization
that was achieved. More worrisome  is that the structure  of the GATS (the framework)  allows Members
not to bind the status quo in many sectors. Very much  remains to be done to make the coverage  of the
GATS universal. The fundamental  question  then is whether  the GATS will induce  Members  to do much
more in future  negotiating  rounds. Although  a number  of doubts  have been  expressed  in this connection,
many of its architectural  shortcomings  can be addressed  relatively  easily; while others are probably  best
dealt with by expanding  disciplines  to apply to both goods  and services. Key 'priority' requirements  were
argued to be the scheduling (binding) of all sectors--preferably  as part of a shift to a negative list
approach--and  the elimination  of modes of supply in the schedules. The credibility of the GATS as a
multilateral instrument of liberalization  greatly depends  on the political will of Members to agree to
33 See Hoekman  (1993)  and Hoekman  and Mavroidis  (1995)  for discussions  on safeguards  and government
procurement.
32market opening in the areas in which negotiations  are ongoing (especially  financial services,  where the
deadline  is July 1995),  and on their willingness  to discuss  and make  changes  to the structure  of the  GATS
(Sauve, 1995).
The transparency  value of shifting  to a negative  list cannot  be overemphasized. A reference  to
the experience  obtained  in agreeing  to the  Trade Policy  Review  Mechanism  is appropriate  here. Although
most countries did not have much desire to subject themselves  to a transparency-based  review of their
trade policies, the benefit of obtaining information  on trading partners  outweighed  the perceived  cost of
being subjected  to review  as well. The result of the agreement  to create the TPR has been that domestic
groups (and the Ministry of Finance)  have access to a substantial  amount of information  regarding  the
trade policy stance that is pursued, and can more easily compare this with policies applied by other
countries. Greater  transparency  and better information  will  help analysts  determine  the costs and benefits
of current policy in services  sectors. Without objective  data, analysis  is greatly impeded, and therefore
the formation of interest groups  that would favor liberalization." Objective  attempts  at tariffication  and
calculation  of price-cost  margins,  even if not used as an explicit  focal  point for negotiations,  can  do much
to expand  the amount  of information  regarding  potential  market opportunities  and relative  restrictiveness
of regulatory regimes. The WTO Secretariat  or the OECD  could be given the task to undertake  such an
effort (which should of course be adequately  funded).
More generally  it must be recognized  that the problems involved in 'fixing' the GATS extend
beyond services.  Future multilateral efforts must center on eliminating the artificial goods-services
distinction, and develop  generic disciplines  on FDI and labor  movement. In this context  attention  could
also be devoted to exploring whether and how market access commitments  might be replaced with
competition  disciplines. Market access restrictions as defined in the GATS are, of course, not limited
to services, although  competition is often more restricted in these industries than in goods producing
sectors.  The subject of competition policy has been actively discussed as a likely topic for future
multilateral  negotiations  under WTO auspices. The same  applies  to policies  affecting  investment. It will
be important  that attention  is devoted to both goods and services  in this connection,  and that the same
rules apply  to goods  and services  (see the Chapter by Low and Subramanian  in this volume). The likely
further expansion  of the multilateral trading system to include rules on policies affecting investment
constitutes  an additional  important  reason for developing  horizontal,  generally  applicable  disciplines  on
a mode-of-supply  basis.  Extending  the GATS approach  of scheduling  by mode of supply  on a positive
list basis to the GATT context when addressing  investment-related  matters would be most unfortunate.
34  A negative  list  approach  to scheduling,  while  important  and necessary,  is not sufficient  to allow  analysis.
An additional  requirement  is that comparable  production,  consumption  and trade  data are available. Members
should  be required  to report  such  data  for at least  the 11  major  GNS  service  sectors,  and  preferably  on a '2-digit'
basis  (see Annex  1). See Hoekman  and  Stem  (1991)  more  generally  on data needs.
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36Annex I
GNS Classification  List  '2-digit'  output weights35
1. BUSINESS  SERVICES
A. Professional  Services  8.0
a. Legal Services
b. Accounting,  auditing  and bookkeeping  services
c. Taxation  Services
d. Architectural  services
e. Engineering  services
f. Integrated  engineering  services
g. Urban planning  and landscape  architectural  services
h. Medical  and dental services
i. Veterinary  services
j.  Services  provided  by midwives, nurses, physiotherapists  and para-medical  personnel
k.  Other
B. Computer  and Related  Services  2.0
a. Consultancy  services related to the installation  of computer  hardware
b. Software  implementation  services
c. Data processing  services
d. Data base services
e. Other
C. Research  and Development  Services  2.0
a. R.D services  on natural sciences
b. R.D services  on social sciences and humanities
c. Interdisciplinary  R.D services
D. Real Estate Services  5.0
a. Involving  own or leased  property
b. On a fee or contract  basis
E. Rental/Leasing  Services  without  Operators  2.0
a. Relating  to ships
b. Relating  to aircraft
c. Relating  to other  transport equipment
d. Relating  to other machinery  and equipment
e. Other
F. Other Business  Services  10.0
a. Advertising  services
b. Market research and public opinion  polling  services
c. Management  consulting  service
d. Services  related to man. consulting
e. Technical  testing  and analysis serv.
f. Services  incidental  to agriculture,  hunting  and forestry
g. Services  incidental  to fishing
h. Services  incidental  to mining
i. Services  incidental  to manufacturing
j.  Services  incidental  to energy distribution
k. Placement  and supply services of Personnel
1. Investigation  and security
m. Related  scientific  and technical  consulting  services
I  Estimated share of 2-digit categories  in total service  sector output of an  'average'  industrialized  country.
Adapted from UNCTAD and World Bank (1994, pp.  169-72).  Adjustments were made to reduce the weight of real
estate services and to distribute  'other  services'  across sectors to ensure that weights add to 100.
37n. Maintenance  and repair of equipment  (not incl. transport  equipment)
o. Building-cleaning  services
p. Photographic  services
q. Packaging  services
r. Printing,  publishing
s. Convention  services
t. Other
2. COMMUNICATION  SERVICES
A. Postal services  0.5
B. Courier services  0.2
C. Telecommunication  services  3.8
a. Voice telephone  services
b. Packet-switched  data transmission  services
c. Circuit-switched  data transmission  services
d. Telex services
e. Telegraph  services
f. Facsimile  services
g.  Private leased  circuit  services
h. Electronic  mail
i. Voice mail
j. On-line  information  and data base retrieval
k. electronic  data interchange  (EDI)
1.  enhanced/value-added  facsimile  services, incl. store and forward, store and retrieve
m. code and protocol  conversion
n. on-line information  and/or data processing  (incl.transaction  processing)
o. other
D. Audiovisual  services  0.9
a. Motion picture and video tape production  and distribution  services
b. Motion picture  projection  service
c. Radio  and television  services
d. Radio and television  transmission  services
e. Sound  recording
f. Other
E. Other
3. CONSTRUCTION  AND RELATED  ENGINEERING  SERVICES
A. General  construction  work for buildings  3.5
B. General construction  work for civil engineering  1.5
C. Installation  and assembly  work  1.0
D. Building  completion  and finishing  work  1.0
E. Other
4. DISTRIBUTION  SERVICES
A. Commission  agents' services  0.7
B. Wholesale  trade services  8.7
C. Retailing  services  9.6
D. Franchising  5.0
E. Other
5. EDUCATIONAL  SERVICES
A. Primary education  services  1.5
B. Secondary  education  services  0.1
C. Higher education  services  2.0
D. Adult  education  1.0
E. Other education  services
386.  ENVIRONMENTAL  SERVICES
A.  Sewage services  0.1
B. Refuse disposal services  0.5
C.  Sanitation and similar services  0.1
D. Other
7. FINANCIAL  SERVICES
A.  All insurance and insurance-related services  3.8
a.  Life, accident and health insurance services
b.  Non-life  insurance services
c.  Reinsurance and retrocession
d.  Services auxiliary to insurance (including brokerage  and agency services)
B. Banking and other financial services (excluding insurance)  6.0
a. Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public
b.  Lending of all types,  incl., inter alia, consumer credit,  mortgage credit,  factoring  and financing
of commercial transaction
c. Financial leasing
d.  All payment and money transmission services
e. Guarantees  and commitments
f. Trading  for own account or for account of customers,  whether on an exchange,  in an
over-the-counter  market or otherwise, the following:
- money market instruments (cheques,  bills, certificate of deposits,  etc.)
- foreign exchange
- derivative products incl., but not limited to, futures and options
- exchange rate and interest rate instruments,  incl. products  such as swaps,  forward
rate agreements,  etc.
- transferable  securities
- other negotiable instruments and financial assets,  incl.  bullion
g.  Participation in issues of all kinds of securities,  incl. under-writing  and placement
as agent (whether publicly or  privately) and provision of service  related to such issues
h.  Money broking
i.  Asset management, such as cash or portfolio management,  all forms of collective
investment management, pension fund management,  custodial depository and trust services
j.  Settlement and clearing services for financial assets,  incl.  securities, derivative products,
and other negotiable instruments
k.  Advisory and other auxiliary financial services on all the activities listed in Article IB of
MTN.TNC/W/50,  incl. credit reference  and analysis,  investment and portfolio research and
advice,  advice on acquisitions and on corporate restructuring  and strategy
1. Provision and transfer of financial information,  and financial data processing and related
software by providers of other financial services
C.  Other
8.  HEALTH RELATED AND SOCIAL SERVICES (other than those listed under  I.A.h-j.)
A. Hospital services  1.6
B. Other Human llealth  Services  2.3
C. Social Services  0.8
D.  Other
9. TOURISM AND TRAVEL  RELATED SERVICES
A.  Hotels and restaurants (incl. catering)  3.0
B. Travel agencies and tour operators services  0.3
C. Tourist guides services  0.1
D.  Other
10. RECREATIONAL,  CULTURAL AND SPORTING SERVICES (other  than audiovisual services)
39A. Entertainment  services (including  theater, live bands and circus services)  0.5
B. News  agency services  0.1
C. Libraries, archives, museums  and other cultural  services  0.1
D. Sporting  and other recreational  services  0.5
E. Other
11. TRANSPORT  SERVICES
A. Maritime  Transport Services  1.5
a. Passenger transportation
b. Freight  transportation
c. Rental  of vessels with crew
d. Maintenance  and repair of vessels
e. Pushing  and towing  services
f. Supporting  services for maritime  transport
B. Internal Waterways  Transport  0.2
a. Passenger  transportation
b. Freight  transportation
c. Rental of vessels with crew
d. Maintenance  and repair of vessels
e. Pushing  and towing  services
f. Supporting  services  for internal  waterway  transport
C. Air Transport Services  1.5
a. Passenger  transportation
b. Freight  transportation
c. Rental of aircraft with  crew
d. Maintenance  and repair of aircraft
e. Supporting  services for air transport
D. Space  Transport  0.1
E. Rail Transport  Services  1.5
a. Passenger transportation
b. Freight  transportation
c. Pushing and towing  services
d. Maintenance  and repair of rail transport  equipment
e. Supporting  services for rail transport  services
F. Road Transport Services  2.5
a. Passenger transportation
b. Freight transportation
c. Rental  of commercial  vehicles  with operator
d. Maintenance  and repair of road transport  equipment
e. Supporting  services for road transport  services
G. Pipeline  Transport  0.5
a. Transportation  of fuels
b. Transportation  of other goods
H. Services  auxiliary  to all modes of transport  2.0
a. Cargo-handling  services
b. Storage  and warehouse  services
c. Freight  transport agency services
d. Other
1. Other Transport  Services
12. OTHER  SERVICES  NOT INCLUDED  ELSEWHERE  0.4
Sum  of weights: 100.0
40Annex  2: GATS  Schedules  and 'Revealed'  Relative  Restrictiveness  of Service  Markets
The schedules  of GATS Members  can be used to generate information  on the relative restrictiveness  of
policy regimes pertaining  to service industries  by assuming  that the coverage of each country's schedule is an
indicator  of the policy  stance  that is pursued. The more liberal a country, the less constrained  its government  can
be expected  to be in binding  the status quo in the GATS. The higher the coverage  ratio of its schedule,  the more
liberal the country  relative to other  countries. A possible  procedure then is to relate each country's  coverage  ratio
to a benchmark  'guesstimate'  of what the tariff  equivalent  of the most protectionist  nation  mnight  be, to get a country-
specific  'tariff equivalent'. For example, if a country's coverage  ratio for a sector is 0.7--i.e., 70 percent of the
sector is bound  under GATS--this  implies that 30 percent has been left off the table. One way of getting a 'tariff
equivalent' would  then be to set this at 0.3 times the benchmark  guesstimate  of the tariff equivalent  for the most
protectionist  country--one  that has not made any commitments  for a sector.
The 'tariff equivalent' list for the 'most restrictive' country is completely  arbitrary.  In what follows, a
value of 200  percent was chosen for sectors  where  access tends to be prohibited  by most countries,  and which do
not appear in most schedules (maritime cabotage, air transport proper (as opposed to ground services), postal
services,  voice  telecommunications,  and  life insurance).  The rest varies between  20 and 50 percent (see  the Annex
Table).
As discussed  further in the text, commitments  can be broken down into three broad categories: 'None',
implying  no restrictions  are applied  on either  market  access  or national  treatment  for a given mode  of supply/sector;
'Unbound', meaning  no comritment is made for a given mode of supply/sector;  and 'Other', which in practice
implies that bound  restrictions  are listed for a mode of supply/sector. For quantification  purposes  a value of '1'
is allocated  to all instances  where 'None' is found; a zero in all instances  of 'Unbound'; and 0.5 if specific  bound
restrictions  are listed. For purposes  of this exercise  only  data on market  access  restrictions  are used. These weights
are used to calculate coverage ratios for GATS  Members.
To be useful for empirical  work it is necessary  to use a standard industrial  classification,  rather than the
GATS list of sectors.  The GATS list was therefore first concorded to the International Standard Industrial
Classification  (ISIC). The following  value  was then  calculated: [1-x/y]  for  each ISIC  item, where  xis the weighted
coverage for a sector for country  and y is the total  coverage  possible for each category. Because  some ISIC items
are much more disaggregated  in the GATS list than others, these totals vary widely.  For example, the ISIC
category 'business services' embodies 27 GATS subsectors.  Given 4 modes of supply per  subsector, the
denominator  for this item  is 108. In other  cases a GATS  sector is equivalent  to an ISIC  sector, and the denominator
is 4 (as there are four modes of supply). The resulting  numbers range between  0 and 1.  0 is analogous  to 'free
access' (no restrictions), I is equivalent  to 'no access' in the sense that no bindings are made for any mode of
supply. The coverage  ratios were then multiplied  by the benchmark  vector  of tariffs. The Annex  Table  that follows
reports the assumed  benchmark 'tariff equivalents' for ISIC sectors, the sectoral  weights used for aggregation  to
2-digit and I-digit  ISIC, and the 'tariff equivalents'  for selected GATS  Members, i.e., [(l-x/y)*t], where t is the
assumed  benchmark  tariff equivalent.  The Table also reports results aggregated  up to 1-digit ISIC, using the
weights shown.
Guesstimates  for sectors 5 and 6 tend to be low; those for 7 very high (as they should be, given the air
transport  cartel and the absence  of offers in maritime  and basic telecoms);  and those for 8 and 9 in between. It
should be re-emphasized  that this is simply  a method to get a handle on the relative  restrictiveness  of countries.
The value of the numbers  that emerge are a function  of the 'reasonableness' of the assumed  benchmark  vector of
tariff equivalents,  and the correlation  between  offers made in the GATS  context and a Member's actual policy
stance. As can be seen  from the Table, there are countries  where the relative  restrictiveness  is expected  to be high
based on this methodology,  but where  the actual  policy stance  is relatively  liberal. Cases in point are Hong Kong
or Macau, traditional  free traders.  However, the fact remains that these economies  did not bind the status quo,
implying  a non-zero  probability that the regime  may become substantially  more restrictive  in the future assuming
41it is indeed liberal now.
Clearly the methodology would be improved upon by incorporating information on the actual policy regimes
that are in force in the various countries.  But, this is precisely the problem:  no data on this exists.  The main issue
then is how to come up with reasonable estimates of the benchmark  tariff vector for the  'most  restrictive'  case.
This is an area on which future research should focus.  Given the absence of data on barriers to trade,  the GATS-
based coverage data might be used in CGE exercises to simulate the effects--and possible orders of magnitude--of
liberalizing trade in services.  Care must be  taken, however,  in allowing for a wide range of 'benchmark'  tariff
equivalents in such simulations.
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'Tariff  equivalents' for 2-digit ISIC  sectors,  Benchmark  1-digit  2-digit  australia  austria  canada  EU  finland  hong  japan  korea  mexico  new
Selected GATS Members  kong  zealand
_________ tariff  et  .weights  weights
ISIC No.
5  constr  40.0  1.0  1.0  12.0  5.0  6.0  10.0  19.0  32.0  5.0  16.0  24.0  5.0
61  mv repair  40.0  0.1  1.0  40.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  40.0  5.0  40.0  10.0  40.0
62  wholesale  40.0  0.4  1.0  5.0  5.0  10.0  12.5  5.0  40.0  5.0  27.5  25.0  5.0
63  retail  40.0  0.4  1.0  7.5  5.0  10.0  10.0  5.0  30.0  5.0  20.0  25.0  22.5
64  hot/rest  20.0  0.2  1.0  2.5  2.5  5.0  5.0  2.5  10.0  2.5  2.5  5.0  2.5
71  land transp  50.0  0.2  1.0  43.8  45.6  21.9  31.9  36.3  50.0  37.5  46.3  46.3  23.8
72A  maritime/waterway trans.  50.0  0.1  0.7  37.5  43.8  46.4  47.9  50.0  39.6  35.4  38.0  50.0  40.1
72B  maritime cabotage  200.0  0.1  0.3  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0
73A  supporting air transport  50.0  0.0  0.2  32.5  32.5  35.0  32.5  32.5  50.0  33.8  42.5  45.0  48.8
73B  air trans. proper  200.0  0.1  0.8  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0
74  aux transp  50.0  0.1  1.0  23.8  32.5  18.8  32.5  23.8  50.0  32.5  41.3  42.5  50.0
75A  post (incl. courier)  200.0  0.2  1.0  200.0  25.0  50.0  200.0  200.0  100.0  200.0  200.0  100.0  200.0
75B  basic tele  200.0  0.7  0.8  200.0  150.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  75.0  200.0  200.0  200.0
75C  va telecom  100.0  0.2  0.2  25.0  25.0  12.5  25.0  12.5  50.0  12.5  12.5  100.0  12.5
81+82  fin ser (excl. life insurance)  50.0  0.2  0.9  16.7  12.5  17.9  25.0  18.8  27.9  25.0  35.4  40.0  18.8
81+82  life insurance  200.0  0.0  0.2  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0
83  real est  50.0  0.1  1.0  18.8  6.3  12.5  18.8  12.5  37.5  18.8  50.0  50.0  6.3
84  rental  40.0  0.1  1.0  12.0  12.0  5.0  17.0  13.0  28.0  19.0  21.0  20.0  5.0
85  computer  20.0  0.1  1.0  6.0  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  6.0  2.5  2.5  17.0  6.0
86A  R&D (social sciences)  20.0  0.0  0.2  14.2  2.5  14.2  15.0  14.2  20.0  14.2  17.5  5.0  20.0
86B  R&D (hard)  100.0  0.0  0.8  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
89  business  40.0  0.4  1.0  12.2  8.3  17.2  13.3  11.3  30.9  17.0  18.7  25.6  28.3
92  sewage  50.0  0.1  1.0  17.2  6.3  6.3  6.3  31.3  50.0  6.3  26.6  50.0  50.0
93  education  50.0  0.1  1.0  23.8  23.8  50.0  20.0  50.0  50.0  22.5  50.0  20.0  23.8
94  healthlsoc  50.0  0.6  1.0  30.2  14.6  50.0  29.2  35.4  50.0  44.8  50.0  33.3  42.7
96  recr, culture  20.0  0.2  1.0  14.4  11.3  18.8  13.8  14.4  17.1  6.9  14.4  15.8  15.6
ISIC 5: Construction  12.0  5.0  6.0  10.0  19.0  32.0  5.0  16.0  24.0  5.0
ISIC 6: Wholesale and Retail Distribution  7.4  4.6  9.0  10.0  4.6  31.5  4.6  21.4  21.3  13.4
ISIC 7: Transport, Storage and Communications  183.4  98.7  117.7  182.0  181.0  149.8  142.0  184.9  152.3  181.5
ISIC 8:  Business and Financial Services  24.8  20.1  25.9  27.2  23.8  39.0  28.9  36.3  40.9  30.5
ISIC 9:  Social and Personal Services, incl. Health, Education, Entertainment  25.4  13.9  40.2  23.6  31.7  42.9  32.3  40.7  29.8  36.1
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43Annex  2 Table
'Tariff  equivalents' for 2-digit ISIC sectors,  norway  singapore  sweden  switzerland  turkey  usa  argentina  bahrain  bangladesh  brazil  camerouw  chle  china Selected GATS  Members  -
ISIC No.
5  constr  5.0  12.0  12.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  12.0  40.0  40.0  25.0  40.0  40.0  25.0
61  my repair  40.0  40.0  20.0  5.0  40.0  5.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0
62  wholesale  22.5  40.0  5.0  10.0  40.0  5.0  22.5  40.0  40.0  32.5  40.0  40.0  40.0
63  retail  5.0  40.0  25.0  7.5  40.0  5.0  5.0  40.0  40.0  20.0  40.0  40.0  40.0
64  hot/rest  2.5  2.5  2.5  5.0  2.5  2.5  2.5  20.0  10.0  12.5  12.5  2.5  10.0
71  land transp  28.8  50.0  38.8  25.0  36.3  27.5  50.0  50.0  50.0  47.5  50.0  50.0  47.5
72A  maritime/waterway trans.  50.0  39.1  50.0  32.8  35.4  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  43.2
72B  maritime cabotage  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0
73A  supporting air transport  32.5  50.0  32.5  43.8  31.3  41.3  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  40.0  50.0
73B  air trans. proper  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0
74  aux transp  50.0  50.0  50.0  15.0  50.0  42.5  50.0  50.0  50.0  42.5  50.0  50.0  27.5
75A  post (incl. courier)  50.0  75.0  200.0  200.0  -100.0  25.0  25.0  200.0  200.0  75.0  200.0  200.0  200.0
75B  basic tele  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  92.9  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  171.4  200.0
75C  va telecom  12.5  37.5  12.5  12.5  42.9  12.5  12.5  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  71.4  100.0
81+82  fun ser (excl. life insurance)  20.8  22.5  8.3  17.1  9.2  12.5  19.2  40.0  50.0  42.1  50.0  34.2  38.3
81+82  life insurance  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0
83  real est  28.1  50.0  6.3  50.0  50.0  6.3  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  25.0
84  rental  14.0  40.0  14.0  15.0  40.0  19.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  34.0  40.0
85  computer  2.5  6.0  2.5  2.5  8.0  2.5  2.5  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0  10.0
86A  R&D (social sciences)  14.2  14.2  14.2  2.5  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0
86B  R&D (hard)  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
89  business  9.8  21.7  15.2  9.8  26.7  10.6  25.7  40.0  40.0  35.0  39.4  35.6  29.3
92  sewage  20.3  50.0  6.3  7.8  21.9  6.3  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0
93  education  16.3  50.0  50.0  27.5  22.5  33.8  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  46.3
94  health/soc  28.1  36.5  31.3  41.7  44.8  43.8  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  47.9
96  recr, culture  15.6  14.6  13.1  14.2  18.5  3.3  17.1  20.0  20.0  20.0  19.4  17.1  20.0
ISIC 5: Construction  5.0  12.0  12.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  12.0  40.0  40.0  25.0  40.0  40.0  25.0
ISIC 6: Wholesale  and Retail  Distribution  13.4  34.4  13.4  8.0  34.4  4.6  13.4  37.0  35.5  24.9  35.9  34.4  35.5
ISIC  7: Transport,  Storage  and Communications  122.2  138.8  184.2  178.1  31.6  111.4  116.9  193.9  193.9  142.7  193.9  182.2  191.1
ISIC 8:  Business  and Financial  Services  25.7  35.9  22.5  27.7  35.4  21.7  36.9  48.8  51.0  47.0  50.7  45.2  39.8
ISIC 9:  Social and Personal Services, incl.  24.0  33.7  26.9  32.3  35.9  31.7  42.9  43.6  43.6  43.6  43.4  42.9  42.0 Health,  Education, Entertainment
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44Annex  2 Table
'Tariff  equivalents' for 2-digit ISIC sectors,  colombia  cote  czech  egypt  hungary  india  indonesia  israel  kenya  kuwait  rnacau  malaysia  morocco
Selected GATS Members  ivoire  rep
ISIC No.
5  constr  20.0  37.0  19.0  19.0  40.0  34.0  16.0  40.0  40.0  28.0  40.0  10.0  30.0
61  mv repair  40.0  5.0  25.0  40.0  5.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  15.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0
62  wholesale  40.0  40.0  22.5  40.0  22.5  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  25.0  40.0  40.0  40.0
63  retail  40.0  40.0  10.0  40.0  5.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  32.5  40.0  40.0  40.0
64  hot/rest  7.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  10.0  5.0  5.0  2.5  12.5  10.0  5.0  2.5
71  land transp  50.0  39.4  45.0  47.5  36.3  50.0  50.0  50.0  35.6  50.0  50.0  50.0  45.0
72A  maritime/waterway trans.  50.0  42.7  37.5  42.2  42.7  50.0  43.8  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  37.5  50.0
72B  maritime cabotage  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0
73A  supporting air transport  50.0  50.0  38.8  50.0  32.5  50.0  50.0  50.0  37.5  50.0  50.0  50.0  35.0
73B  air trans. proper  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0
74  aux transp  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  41.3  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0
75A  post (incl. courier)  200.0  200.0  75.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  -150.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0
75B  basic tele  185.7  200.0  178.6  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  192.9  200.0  200.0  157.1  200.0
75C  va telecom  50.0  100.0  25.0  100.0  12.5  64.3  57.1  73.2  100.0  100.0  100.0  46.4  46.4
81+82  fin ser (excl. life insurance)  28.3  50.0  30.0  20.4  31.3  36.3  27.5  28.8  43.8  50.0  23.3  27.1  35.0
81+82  life insurance  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0
83  real est  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0
84  rental  35.0  40.0  30.0  40.0  15.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  36.0  22.0  40.0
85  computer  10.0  20.0  2.5  20.0  6.0  16.0  16.0  6.0  20.0  14.0  20.0  11.0  18.5
86A  R&D (social sciences)  20.0  20.0  14.2  20.0  2.5  18.3  16.7  20.0  20.0  12.5  20.0  15.0  20.0
86B  R&D (hard)  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
89  business  35.6  38.3  20.9  40.0  9.4  38.9  34.1  25.4  40.0  29.4  40.0  21.3  38.7
92  sewage  50.0  50.0  26.6  50.0  28.1  50.0  50.0  6.3  50.0  35.9  50.0  50.0  31.3
93  education  50.0  50.0  12.5  50.0  20.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0
94  health/soc  42.7  50.0  41.7  50.0  28.1  45.8  50.0  50.0  50.0  40.6  50.0  37.5  50.0
96  recr, culture  18.5  17.1  17.9  19.0  16.5  18.8  18.8  17.3  14.6  17.5  19.4  13.8  18.1
ISIC 5: Construction  20.0  37.0  19.0  19.0  40.0  34.0  16.0  40.0  40.0  28.0  40.0  10.0  30.0
ISIC 6: Wholesale and Retail Distribution  35.1  32.6  14.6  34.4  11.6  35.5  34.8  34.8  33.1  26.9  35.5  34.8  34.4
ISIC 7: Transport, Storage and Conununications  185.4  191.7  129.6  193.3  182.7  191.1  190.4  51.8  188.4  193.9  193.9  175.8  188.2
ISIC 8:  Business and Financial Services  43.4  50.3  36.5  44.5  30.9  47.2  43.1  39.0  49.6  45.9  44.9  36.1  47.0
ISIC 9:  Social  and Personal  Services,  incl.  38.6  42.9  33.4  43.3  25.0  40.6  43.3  39.9  42.4  36.0  43.4  34.2  41.8
Healti, Education,  Entertainment  _
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45Annex 2 Table
'Tariff  equivalents' for 2-digit ISIC sectors,  pakistan  peru  phippines poland  south afr.  sri lanka  tanzania  thailand  trinidad  tunisia  uruguay  venezuela  zimbabwe
Selected GATS  Members
ISIC No.
5  constr  34.0  40.0  40.0  5.0  12.0  40.0  40.0  28.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  35.0  40.0
61  mv repair  40.0  40.0  0.0  40.0  5.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0
62  wholesale  40.0  32.5  40.0  25.0  22.5  40.0  40.0  32.5  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0
63  retail  40.0  32.5  40.0  27.5  5.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0
64  hot/rest  7.5  15.0  5.0  2.5  7.5  10.0  5.0  10.0  0.0  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5
71  land transp  50.0  50.0  21.3  50.0  41.9  50.0  50.0  40.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0
72A  maritime/waterway trans.  50.0  48.4  39.1  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  39.1  42.2  50.0  50.0  47.4  50.0
72B  maritime cabotage  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0
73A  supporting air transport  50.0  50.0  31.3  32.5  50.0  50.0  50.0  41.3  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0
73B  air trans. proper  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0
74  aux transp  50.0  50.0  20.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  45.0  50.0  50.0  41.3  32.5  50.0
75A  post (incl. courier)  200.0  200.0  25.0  25.0  25.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  75.0  75.0  200.0
75B  basic tele  200.0  200.0  200.0  185.7  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  153.6
75C  va telecom  89.3  62.5  46.4  64.3  50.0  100.0  100.0  82.1  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  12.5
81+82  fin ser (excl. life insurance)  40.8  47.5  13.8  39.2  38.8  50.0  50.0  35.4  47.1  34.6  42.5  32.9  35.0
81+82  life insurance  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0  200.0
83  real est  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  6.3  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  6.3  50.0  50.0
84  rental  40.0  37.0  26.0  40.0  12.0  40.0  40.0  36.0  40.0  40.0  19.0  40.0  40.0
85  computer  11.0  20.0  20.0  6.0  2.5  20.0  20.0  12.0  12.0  20.0  2.5  5.0  20.0
86A  R&D (social sciences)  15.8  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0  6.7  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0
86B  R&D (hard)  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
89  business  35.4  36.5  38.7  28.3  15.0  40.0  40.0  29.1  37.0  40.0  33.5  32.2  40.0
92  sewage  50.0  50.0  50.0  39.1  6.3  50.0  50.0  25.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0
93  education  50.0  50.0  50.0  25.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  38.8  42.5  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0
94  health/soc  37.5  50.0  50.0  30.2  28.1  50.0  50.0  50.0  34.4  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0
96  recr. culture  19.4  18.1  19.0  19.0  17.1  19.2  20.0  16.7  16.0  19.6  15.6  18.5  17.5
ISIC 5: Construction  34.0  40.0  40.0  5.0  12.0  40.0  40.0  28.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  35.0  40.0
ISIC 6: Wholesale and Retail Distribution  35.1  30.3  32.8  23.4  12.4  35.5  34.8  32.5  34.0  34.4  34.4  34.4  34.4
ISIC 7: Transport, Storage and Communications  193.1  190.9  110.2  116.0  118.3  193.9  193.9  189.6  193.8  193.9  143.1  142.1  172.1
ISIC 8:  Business and Financial Services  46.4  48.7  41.7  42.6  29.1  51.0  51.0  42.2  48.5  47.6  38.6  42.9  47.7
ISIC 9:  Social and Personal Services, incl.  35.4  43.2  43.3  28.1  25.8  43.4  43.6  40.3  32.1  43.5  42.6  43.3  43.0
Health. Education,  Entertainment  [
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46Annex 3: GATS  Mem'bers:  Number  of Sectors  Scheduled
(Maximum  number=620, i.e., 155 activities times 4 modes of supply)
Developing  Countries  Paraguay  36  'HIC' Members
Peru  96
Algeria  4  Philippines  160  Australia  360
Antigua  & Barbuda  68  Poland  212  Austria  412
Antifles  (Netherlands) 144  Romania  176  Canada  352
Argentina  208  St. Lucia  32  European  Union  392
Aruba  140  St. Vincent  &  Finland  328
Bahrain  16  the Grenadines  32  Hong Kong  200
Bangladesh  4  Senegal  104  Iceland  372
Barbados  24  SlovaIk  Republic  308  Japan  408
Belize  8  South Africa  288  Korea  311
Benin  44  Sri Lanka  8  Mexico  252
Bolivia  24  Suriname  16  New Zealand  276
Brazil  156  Swaziland  36  Norway  360
Brunei  76  Tanzania  4  Singapore  232
Burkina  Faso  8  Thailand  260  Sweden  320
Cameroon  12  Trinidad &  Switzerland  400
Chile  140  Tobago  68  Liechtenstein  312
China  196  Tunisia  52  Turkey  276
Colombia  164  Uganda  8  USA  384
Congo  16  Uruguay  96
Costa Rica  52  Venezuela  156
Cote D'Ivoire  56  Zambia  64
Cuba  120  Zimbabwe  72
Cyprus  36
Czech Republic  304
Dominica  20
Dominican  Republic  264
El Salvador  92
Egypt  104




























47Annex 4:  Mode of Supply Weights
Mode  Service Sector  Number of  Sector weight in  Adjustment for Mode of supply
subsectors  GDP  exluded sub  weight
sectors
1. Business  services
1  A. Prof  n=11  8  1  0.1
2  8  1  0.1
3  8  1  0.4
4  8  1  0.4
1  B. Computer  n=5  2  1  0.3
2  2  1  0.1
3  2  1  0.2
4  2  1  0.4
1  C. R&D  n=3  2  0.1  0.3
2  2  0.1  0.1
3  2  0.1  0.2
4  2  0.1  0.4
1  D.  Real Est  n=2  5  1  0
2  5  1  0
3  5  1  0.9
4  5  1  0.1
1  E.  Rental  n=5  2  0.5  0.2
2  2  0.5  0.2
3  2  0.5  0.5
4  2  0.5  0.1
1  F. Other  Business  n=20  10  I  0.1
2  10  1  0.1
3  10  1  0.4
4  10  1  0.4
2. Communication
1  A.  Post  n=l  0.5  1  0.2
2  0.5  1  C
3  0.5  1  0.8
4  0.5  1  C
1  B. Courier  n=l  0.2  1  0.4
2  0.2  1  C
3  0.2  1  0.4
4  0.2  1  0.2
1  C. Telecom  n=14  3.8  1  0.4
2  3.8  1  C
3  3.8  1  0.5
4  3.8  1  0.1
I  D.  Audio/Visual  n=6  0.9  1  0.3
2  0.9  1  0.1
3  0.9  1  0.4
4  0.9  1  0.2
3.  Construction  I
1  A. Building  n=1  3.5  1  0
2  3.5  1  C
3  3.5  1  0.8
4  3.5  1  0.2
I  B. Civil Eng  n=1  1.5  1  0
2  1.5  1  0
3  1.5  1  0.8
4  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _1.5  . 1  0.2Anmex  4:  Mode of Supply Weights
Mode  Service Sector  Number of  Sector weight in  Adjustment for Mode of supply
subsectors  GDP  excluded sub  weight
sectors









1  A. Agents  n=1  0.7  1  0.2
2  0.7  1  0.1
3  0.7  1  0.6
4  0.7  1  0.1
I  B. Wholesale  n=1  8.7  1  0.2
2  8.7  1  0
3  8.7  1  0.7
4  8.7  1  0.1
I  C. Retail  n=1  9.6  1  0.1
2  9.6  1  0.1
3  .9.6  1  0.7
4  9.6  1  0.1
1  D. Franchising  n=I  5  1  0.5
2  5  1  0
3  5  1  0.5
4  5  1  0
5. Education
I  AAPrinary  n=1  1.5  0.1  0
2  1.5  0.1  0.2
3  1.5  0.1  0.8
4  1.5  0.1  0
1  B. Secondary  n-i  0.1  0.1  0
2  0.1  0.1  0.2
3  0.1  0.1  0.8
4  0.1  0.1  0
1  C. Tertiary  n=1  2  1  0
2  2  1  0.3
3  2  1  0.6
4  2  1  0.1
1  D. Adult  n-i  I  I  0.1
2  1  1  0.2
3  1  1  0.5
4  1  1  0.2
6. Enviromnental
I  A.  Sewage  n=1  0.1  I  0
2  0.1  1  0
3  0.1  I  1
4  0.1  1  0
1  B. Refuse  n=I  0.5  1  0.1
2  0.5  1  0
3  0.5  1  0.8
4  0.5  1  0.1
1  C. Sanitation  n-I  0.1  1  0.1
2  0.1  I  0
3  0.1  1  0.8
4  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _0.11  1  0.1
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Mode  Service  Sector  Number  of  Sector  weight in  Adjustment  for Mode of supply
subsectors  GDP  excluded  sub  weight
sectors
7.  Financial
1  A.  Insurance  n=4  3.8  0.5  0.2
2  3.8  0.5  0
3  3.8  0.5  0.7
4  3.8  0.5  0.1
I  B. Banking  n=12  6  1  0.2
2  6  1  0.1
3  6  I  0.6,
4  6  1  0.1
8.  Health,  etc
1  A.  Hospital  n=I  1.6  1  0
2  1.6  1  0.1
3  1.6  1  0.8
4  1.6  1  0.1
1  B. Other human  n=1  2.3  1  0
2  2.3  1  0.1
3  2.3  1  0.8
4  2.3  1  0.1
I  ~~~~~~C.  Social  0.8  1  0.1
2  n=I  0.8  1  0.1
3  0.8  1  0.7
4  0.8  1  0.1
9.Tourism
1  A.  Hotels/Rest.  n= I  3  1  0
2  3  1  0.1
3  3  1  0.8
4  3  1  0.1
1  B. Travel Agencies  n=l  0.3  1  0
2  0.3  1  0.1
3  0.3  1  0.8
4  0.3  1  0.1
1  C.  Guides  n=l  0.1  1  0
2  0.1  1  0.1
3  0.1  1  0.7
4  0.1  1  0.2
10. Recreation
I  A.  Entertainment  n=1  0.5  1  0.2
2  0.5  1  0.1
3  0.5  1  0.1
4  0.5  1  0.6
1  B. News Agrency  n=I  0.1  1  0.2
2  0.1  I  0.1
3  0.1  1  0.35
4  0.1  1  0.35
1  C.  Libraries  n=l  0.1  1  0
2  0.1  1  0.1
3  0.1  1  0.8
4  0.1  I  0.1
1  D.  Sports  n=l  0.5  1  0
2  0.5  1  0.1
3  0.5  1  0.2
4  0.5  1  0.7
11. Transport
1  A.  Maritime  n=6  1.5  0.15  0.1
2  1.5  0.15  0.1
3  1.5  0.15  0.7
4  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _1.5  . 0.15  ,  0.1
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Mode  Service Sector  Number of  Sector weight in  Adjustment for Mode of supply
subsectors  GDP  excluded sub  weight
sectors
B. Waterway  n=6  0.2  1  0.1
2  0.2  1  0.1
3  0.2  1  0.7
4  0.2  1  0.1
I  C. Air  n=5  1.5  0.05  0.3
2  1.5  0.05  0.2
3  1.5  0.05  0.4
4  1.5  0.05  0.1
1  D. Space  n=I  0.1  1  0.3
2  0.1  1  0
3  0.1  1  0.4
4  0.1  1  0.3
1  E. Rail  n=5  1.5  1  0.1
2  1.5  1  0
3  1.5  1  0.8
4  1.5  1  0.1
1  F.Road  n=5  2.5  0.1  0.4
2  2.5  0.1  0.1
3  2.5  0.1  0.4
4  2.5  0.1  0.1
I  G. Pipe  n=2  0.5  0.1  0.2
2  0.5  0.1  0
3  0.5  0.1  0.8
4  0.5  0.1  0
2  H. Auxiliary  n=5  2  1  0.2
2  2  1  0.1
3  2  1  0.6
4  2  1  0.1
1  12. Other nes  n=I  0.4  1  0.2
2  0.4  1  0.1
3  0.4  1  0.5
4  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _0.4  1.  0.2
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